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Contact-based smart-cards, which comply to the International Standard IS0-7816,
communicate with their associated read/write machines via a single bi-directional serial
link. This link is easy to monitor with inexpensive equipment and resources, enabling
captured data to be removed for later examination. In many contact-based smart-cards
the logical abilities are provided by eight-bit rnicrocontroller units (MCU) which are
slow at performing effective cryptographic functions. Consequently, for expediency,
much data may be transferred in plain-text across the vulnerable communications link,
farther easing an eavesdropper's task.

· Practitioners in military communications protect transmitted information by varying a
link's carrier frequency in an apparently random sequence that is shared secretly
between the sender and the authorised receiver. These multiplexing techniques, known
as frequency or channel-hopping, serve to increase the task complexity for and/or
confuse potential eavesdroppers.

The study seeks to ascertain the applicability and value of protection provided by
channel"'hopping techniques, when realised with minimal additional overhead of
microcontroller resources to the contact-based smart-card communications link. The
apparent randomised shuffling of data transferred by these techniqwts has the potential
benefit of deterring those observers who may lack the equipment :·and expertise to
capture and decode the communicated message.
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1. Introduction
This chapter contains an introduction to smart-cards and describes their origins and
. evolution; discusses their relationship with security; and identifies that member of the
smart-card family whose interface is of particular concern. The aims of the study are
itemised, the research question is stated, and a synopsis of the strategy to be pursued is
given.

1.1 Background to the Study

A smart-card may suitably be defined as "A card of ISO dimensions which has in7huilt

logical ability" (Lathom-Sharp, 1995).

This definition is useful in that it

acknowledges the two main features of smart-cards: namely, that standards are in place
to govern the fonn and interface of the cards; and that each card contains an ability to
process data, some or all of which must be communicated to/from the card. The study
is concerned with the privacy of communication of that data, the reasons for which will
be developed in the remainder of this chapter.

A smart-card may be seen as a token which possesses on-board processing power, and .
may carry information about its holder. It has evolved from electronically readable
tokens that emerged in 1960, when airline tickets at Chicago's O'Hare airport had
magnetically encoded data attached to them (Hutcheon, 1992).

Hutcheor: further

reports that the nse of magnetic data swipe cti.rd s had grown by 1991 to an estimated
US circu la ti on in excess of one billion, while Twentyrnan ( 1997) reports that
MasterCard alone has almost 370 types of credit/debit cards in circulation. Hutcheon
further suggests that the growth was primarily due to the widespread acceptance of
Automated Teller Machines (A™) and Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale
(EFTPOS) facilities. This widespread acceptance has led to the popular adoption of
the standard 33/s'' by 2 1/ 8" plastic card favoured by the largest providers, the banks and
credit companies.

6
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Initially, the magnetic strip was used to help combat fraud whereby data (e.g., a credit·
limit) might be written onto the special tape moulded in the reverse of the card.
Today, magnetic swipe cards are in widespread use to control access in a physicru or
· logical sense, and in the main, they are used to distinguish between a person who is
.·,

authorised for access and one who is not. Baker (1991, p. 127) describes thref': basic
ways to make this distinction:-

(i)

using something the person has (e.g., the card itself);

';',
I

(ii)

ascertaining what the person knows (e.g., a PIN); and

(iii)

establishing whom the person is (some unique

i

!·,

idenlijier e.g., a fingerprint).
When accompanied by the additional information of a Personal Identification Number
(PIN), the use of swipe cards can satisfy only items (i) and (ii) above. The conventional
magnetic swipe card, however, is limited in the amount of data that it can reliably
contain, preventing it from canying sufficient data to perform item (iii). Furthormore,
data contained in magnetic stripe cards may be easily read, edited and copied, using
inexpensive equipment, thereby limiting the cards' ability to enact secure transactions.

In particular, such limitations affect off-line operations, this being one of four
requirements identified by Ferguson (1994, p. 318) for an effective electronic cash
system. Specifically, these requirements are:~

" - Security. Every party in the electronic cash system should be protected
from a collusion of all other parties (multi-party security).

- Off-line. There should be no need for communications with a central
authority during payment.

- Fake privacy. The bank and all other shops should together not be able ,,
to derive any knowledge from their protocol transcripts about where a
·· user spends her money.

- Privacy (untraceable). The bank should not be able to detennine whether
two payments were made by the same payer, even if all shops cooperate."

7
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Criminal e!ements find it easy to take advantage of the limitations of magnetic stripe
cards, leading to a level of fraud which Longley (I 994, p. 497) estimates to cost
society hundreds of millions of dollars. The perceived scale of this criminal activity is
illustrated by Fox (I 993), who recounts "The banking card system is teetering on the
brink of collapse. The banks know it and they are just hanging on for as long as they
can, hoping that they can get a new system up and running before the fallibility of the
old system is exposed." Assuming successful trials, it appears likely that the new
banking card system will be based upon smart-cards as they offer superiority, in terms
of security and functionality (Longley, 1994, p. 497) over thdr passive magnetic
predecessors.
There have been successful long-term, high-volume smart-card trials in France, with
some twenty-two million cards issued (Lathom-Sharp, 1995). Ongoing tria1s exist in
other regions such as Australasia, where Visa announced the availability of Stored
Value Cards (SVC) in Australia and New Zealand conunencing July 1995
(ComputerWorld, 31 March 1995), and where MasterCard will run a pilot scheme for
sixteen kilobyte memory SVCs in Canberra, A.C. T. from October 1995 (Financial
Review, 3 April 1995).

Industry shares the view that smart-cards will succeed magnetic stripe cards in
banking: Hovenga, the smart-card technical marketer for Motorola's Microcontroller
Division in Austin, Texas, USA, quoted by Hodgson (1995), says "Probably the
application that is going to drive smart-cards here is financial/banking." Indeed, smartcards, wHI be used in many diverse systems which require positive user identification.
Wh~1t's New in Telecommunications (March/April, 1995, p. 15) describes the

dependency of the European Digital Network upon ,j~1art-cards to provide subscriber
information;

What's New in Electronics (April, 1995, p. 55) outlines their

incorporation into complete network security models for Australian military
~pplications; and Johnson

& Tolly (1995) detail tests perfonned on several

commercial 1mart card products used in Token Authentication applications for
corporate networks.

8
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The concept of an intelligent (smart) card was conceived by Jurgen Dethloff in 1969
and first patented in Japan in 1970 by Prof. Arimura (Townend, 1995). In 1974, the
French inventor Roland Moreno patented worldwide the concept of a plastic card
containing microelectronic processing power (Longley 1994, p. 498), to provide the
card's ir.telligence.

Today, smart-cards are endowed with an embedded

microprocessor and memory sufficient for their particular purpose. By example, the·
smart-card's memory may be used to hold the unique identification data necessary· to
establish Baker's ( 1991, p. 12 7) "who the person is" attribute, which may then be
evaluated against output from on-site sensors, e.g., fingerprint or retina scanners.

At first, smart-card microprocessors and memory devices comprised separate standard
components, and even today's versions will typicaJly contain an eight-bit Central
Processing Unit (CPU) of 1980s origin, e.g., those of the 8051, 68HC05, or HS CPUs
(Townend, 1995). Recognising, however, the peculiar security needs of smart-cards
and the size of the potential market, major electronic organisations have tailored the
microelectronics to the task in hand, Paterson (1991, p, 29) says that security, in·
relation to smart-cards, "can be grouped into three main categories:
•

designed in (intrinsic) security;

•

manufacturing security; and

•

application security."

Briefly, the intrinsic security relates to the situation of the components used. If there
.· exist control, data · and address wires betweeu components of the . on-board
. microelectronics, then there is the possibility of attack by:
•

invasion of the plastic outer sheathing;

•

monitoring of their electromagnetic emissions; or

• · · scanning via electron microscopes (Ferreira, 1990, p. 33 8),
It is considered better, therefore, to place all microelectronic components on the same
silicon die, which, by minimisation of inter-component wiring, may then be made less
wlnerable to such attacks.

9
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·Manufacturing security relates to the controls that are placed over the production and .
testing of the smart-cards, so that they may be neither altered nor researched during

·,:

,,

.i.

this phase of their Ii ves. Typically in vol vecl will be the physical securing of production
facilities and data, and the prevision of internal one-time fusible links to remove
permanently the microelectronics from any test modes when production is complete
(Paterson, 1991, p. 33). Such test modes are used to determine the quaHty of the
silicon chips at several stages of their manufacture and necessarily provide access .to
every detail of the chip under test.

·Application security falls into the domain of the Software Engineer, who may· take
advantage of any hardware. provided features to secure the card provider's application
software and/or data. According to Vedder (1992), the prevalent eight-bit processors
in smart-cards limit their cryptographic abilities to those of challenge and response
methods employing DES-like shared-key algorithms: "Public-Key techniques are not
yet feasible for smart-cards." More recently, however, it is evident that this limitation
may be combatted by incorporation of additional circuitry or finnware, notes Dinnissen
{1995). The extra circuitry may relieve the CPU of specialised software burdens, such
as an intelligent building Local Area Network (LAN) interface (Hodgson, 1995) or
'

encryption processes.

Circuitry for the latter may take the form of a "modular

multiplication module" (Morita, 1990, p. 406), or similar mechanism to assist in the
rrocessing of relatively long-key algorithms such as that created by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman (RSA).

During 1994, Philiips B.V. announced (PhilJips, 1994) their DX

smart-card which employs an "optimised calculation unit" to perform five hundred and
twelve bit RSA computations directed toward secure digital signature generation.
Despite the extra processing power. each signature computation takes approximately
five hundred milliseconds (Phillips, 1994).

\ /.
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It is . appropriate to describe the concept of security in terms of context and
perspective. Landwehr, Heitmeyer & Mclean (1984) provide the following definition:
"A system is secure if it adequately protects information that it processes against
unauthorised disclosure, unauthorised modification, and unauthorised withholding ...
We say adequately because no practical system can achieve these goals without
qualification; security is inherently relative." Historically, in the case of magnetic stripe
credit-cards, it is the author's experience that the card providers exercise total control
over the data that is secured. In the commercial area, as observed by Roberts {199 l ),
"the integrity of infonnation is often of paramount importance, whereas the military
field requires confidentiality as its first priority." Now recall that current smart-cards
incorporate relatively slow eight-bit CPUs (Townend, 1995) which, in turn, detennine
that cryptographic operations on communications with them will be slow.

Vedder

(1992) suggests that processing a sixty-four bit data block using DES will typically
require fifteen milliseconds with a five megahertz CPU clock, and that those sixty-four
data bits will take ten milliseconds to transmit at an (asynchronous) baud rate of
ninety-six hundred bits per second. Given also that communication bandwidth is an
expensive resource, the author considers it likely that the card providers will secure
adequately only that infonnation which is precious to them - unless legislation
mandates otherwise for protection of the cardholders.

Furthermore, Fitzsimmons

(1995), a contributor in the field of Computers and the Law, states, "The laws of
Australia do not recognise any general right of privacy, whether by way

of common

law or by way of constitutional rights"; and, "In addition, there are many
misconceptions concerning privacy. ... People do not have a right to control
information about themselves."
change.

In Australia, at least, the situation is unlikely to

Hilvert (1997) quotes the statement of John Howard, Australian Prime

Minister, on 2 I 11t March 1997 "the Commonwealth will not be implementing privacy
legislation for the private sector" and suggests that "the message for the private sector
is that if it is not specifically legislated against, it is OK to continue to develop and
exploit personally intrusive databases, data mining and privacy probes with little federal
oversight".

Fitzsimmons further indicates that the situation in other countries and

states with regard to persG.ial privacy, may currently he as unprotective as Australia's,
a view shared by De Schutter ( 1991) who states "the individual becomes the weakest

link in the new information technology era, not only from a sociological and e~onomic
11

point of view... , but equally from the angle of legal protection (privacy)."

It is, ·

therefore, conceivable that data, which a cardholder may reasonably desire to remain
secure, is communicated as plain-text in order to maintain a specified performance
from a card whose computational power is provided by an eight-bit processor that is
slow to perfonn cryptographic functions. This lack of privacy is noted by Dinnissen
(1995) who states "cards reveal the card identity and data content to any reader or
anyone tapping communications."

Chip Cards·.
Memory
. Cards

Non·Volatile
Memory
1 Cards

Intelligent
Memory
Cards

SuperSmart
Cards

Contactless
Smart
Cards

Contactbased
Smart
Cards

Hybrid
Smart Cards

Fig'urel.I.

The Smart Card Family and their near relatives - Memory cards~·
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Smart-cards. nay be distinguished from memory cards by their ability to perform
logical operations in addition to storing data. Figure 1.1 indicates that smart-cards
assume one of two main forms: contactless or contact-based. Offshoots from these
.include super smart-cards which incorporate keys and a liquid crystal display (LCD) in
order that the cardholder may interact directly with the card, and hybrid cards which
are magnetic swipe cards additionally equipped to facilitate either contactless and
contact-based smart-card operation. Contactless cards communicate via a modulated
electro-magnetic field~ hence, they may be accessed from distances varying from
several centimetres (for battery-less cards) to fifty metres along a line of sight (for high
frequency, self-powered, cards) (TIRIS, 1994, p. 7). Contact-based cards may only
derive power and communicate via a set of pads, which are expo.sed on one face of the ·
card, when mating with a purpose built connector.
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The applications of contactless cards are many and diverse: e.g., they may be found
tracking products during production/warehousing, or the monitoring of time and
performance data for transport operators (TIRIS, 1994, p. 7). Contactless cards are
currently under consideration by the U.S. Anny for wartime logistics management on a
·global basis, destined within five years to be read by satellite (Van Order, 1995). The
chief attractions of contactless cards, as described by Hook (1995), are that they
- provide reliable non-contact operation; are impervious to most dirt and contaminants;
are environmentally durable; may be recoded in-situ via coded radio signals; and, can
exhibit very low initial costs (from US$0.40c each) and maintenance costs.

The

widespread acceptance of such cards, however, is seen by Hook (1995) as being
limited by the following impediments: lack of recognised de facto or international
standards with respect to operating frequencies or communications protocols; and, a
susceptibility to electro-magnetic interference which is not yet governed by widespread
or unifonn standards. These impediments have led to a market that is populated by
incompatible systems which often require special antenna or circuitry in order to
achieve satisfactory perfonnance in particular envimnments or geographical areas of
operation. Although there are many documented instances of contactless smart-cards
-being used for small financial transactions such as ticketing and incentive schemes
(Seidman, 1995 ), Cordonnier ( 1995) sees the fact that contactless cards may be
accessed remotely as a factor against their being readily accepted by consumers for
larger financial transactions.

Contact-based smart-cards can be accessed only when inserted into, and connected
electrically to, a suitable reader. Three major card issuers are Visa, Mastercard and
· · Europay (VME). Since 1993, these have sought to establish standards that will allow
merchants and users to manage smart-cards (Hoffinan, 1995). Given that the banking
industry currently provides a substantial user base for the smart-card's predecessor, the
magnetic stripe card, then it is likely, as indicated in Hodgson ( 1995), that the
emergent bank driven VME standard will propel smart-cards into widespread use.
Now that major card providers have aligned themselves with the VME standard
(Dancer, 1995) the credit-card proportioned, contact-based, IS0-7816 confonnant
smart-cards may proliferate internationally

14

Although smart-cards may contain different application software and operating
systems, the IS0-7816 standard for smart-cards mandates that card processing
machinery will present a standard mechanical and electrical interface to the cards, and
it homogenises the protocol via which communications are effected.

IS0-9992

provides for standardisation of the "messages between integrated circuit card and the
card accepting device" (Vedder, 1992). If standardised smart-cards replace magnetic
stripe cards as instruments of identification for access control, then many agencies may
access, observe, and potentially alter their contained data. In order to protect against
misuse of that data, it then becomes necessary to apply security measures such as
encryption, the effectiveness of which, as found by Monod (1995), may vary between
no security to a very high level of security.

When probing the security of an entity or system, it is appropriate to identify points of
weakness. One apparent weak point in the highly standardised ISO-7816 smart-cards
is the single contact used as the communications interface between the card and its
associated read/write processing machine. Using simple and readily available circuitry,
as in Figure ,,1.2, it is possible to eavesdrop, unobtrusively and without detection, upon
the entire conversation between the card and the read/write machine. Having collected
the data from the conversation, the eavesdropper may attempt decryption,upon it at
leisure. Conversely, contactless smart-cards, because of their diverse non-standardised
designs and complex reader circuitry, render widespread monitoring of their
communications difficult and/or unattractive.

1: ..

15

Link 1-2 for nonnal
signal;
Link 2-3 to invert signal ..

~ l

+12V

//

{,'.

....----------f 1

//

. .t-•'·

2

RS-232

Point of
eavesdropping
on
·. Smart. card
serial link

Monitoring
device

lOk''

..

. r~.

OV/Ground Rail

Svolt to+/- 12v level-shifting circuitry, allowing
for signal inversion
Eumple of circuitry necessary to monitor contact-based smart-

Figurel.2.

card to read/write machine communications interface•

. .

.··-.'

··.. ·.•.

.. . . .

·:. . ·

-·.,:

•.

'\)'

: H ·.:

.

:

. _ _ I_

_

_

_

_

_

.

....;;...._,_16_ _ _....;;...._,_________;__

_

__.:f ·

.

The smart-card communications interface may be thought of as being a single channel
a]ong which aJI data must pass for the duration of a conversation. The fields of
military communications and radar are subject to similar problems when restricting
their transmissions to a single c..~1mel. The confidentiality, integrity or availability of
their communications channel may be compromised when monitored, eavesdropped or
blocked. One approach to lessen such a compromise, in addition to encryption, is to
use a mechanism known as frequency-hopping, where the data is conveyed upon
carriers whose frequency is altered according to a pattern known only to the legally
communicating parties. The interloper's task is further complicated by the concurrent
transmission of invalid data on those carriers not being used to convey valid data or by
using time division 'T,;Jltiplexing (TDM) of the data on a carrier - i.e., patterned
interspersing periods of valid data and invalid data. Each canier frequency or pattern
of time division may be seen as providing an independent communications cllannel via
which data may be switched, and a direct analogy may be drawn between frequencyhopping or time-division hopping (or a combination of the two) and channeJ.,hopping.

Returning our thoughts to the contact-oriented smart card, the author suggests that a
channel-hopping mechanism, or randomised shuffle of transmitted data, might be
implemented without placing excessive demands on the eight-bit CPUs upon which the
cards currently depend. Such a mechanism would rely upon the valid data being
multiplexed across several channels according to a one-off pattern shared only between
card and read/write machine, and would increase the complexity of an eavesdropper's
task in terms of required equipment and/or methods of message detection. The result
of this increased eavesdropper's task complexity would mean that additional protection
might be provided economically for transmitted data which otherwise may have been
seen as expendable in the face of the high CPU resource costs associated with effective
encryption.

17

1.2

Significance of the Study

From the background discussion, the following is apparent. On the one hand, the IS07816 compliant

contact-based

smart-cards rely upon an easily monitored

communications interface between card and read/write machine using half-duplex
asynchronous character transmission techniques. Transmissions using this interface
may be captured for later inspection by using inexpensive and easily obtained circuitry,
.· an example of which is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Privacy is not guaranteed, therefore,
for the communications link between card and read/write machine, and encryption
currently provides the sole means of achieving security for the card-holder's
communicated data. On the other hand, military communications engineers, in addition
to encrypting their data, have evolved systems of frequency-hopping to complicate
significantly the task of those who wish to interfere with or monitor their
communications channels.

In the above context, each frequency to which the

communications link hops equates to a separate channel along which communicated
data flows for a duration agreed by the communicating parties.

In the main, as found by Townend (1995), IS0-7816 compliant cards employ eight-bit
microcontroller architectures to provide the on-card logical functionality. Such logical
functionality, together with the ability to hold significant amounts of data, as suggested
in Hodgson (I 995), may lead to their adoption as the successors to the magnetic
swipe-cards which are in widespread use today to control access. However, as Vedder
(I 992) c;uggests, their eight-bit microcontrollers, whilst providing economical and

proven technology, are CQmparatively slow in performing the calculations required for
effective encryption.

Importantly, the card-holder has little or no control over what elements of his/her data
are held or transmitted in a secure manner; and, as Fitzsimmons ( 1995) implies, the law
does not offer card-holders consistent levels of protection.

Depending upon the

implementation, Monad (I 995) found that inherent smart-card system security levels
may range from none to very secure.

18

Now consider that magnetic swipe cards may be used for applications unforeseen by
their original supplier. For example. building upon an employee's reluctance to part
with their personal credit card, it is currently possible to use information contained on
credit cards to implement building access control (Kirkpatri,:k, 1995). If smart-cards
become used in similar circumstances, it is then possible that the card will be inserted
into many different read/write machines, each one of which presents an opportunity for
communicated data to be monitored and subsequently inspected using simple circuitry.

This study aims to demonstrate the possibility of adapting channel-hopping techniques
to complicate the task of an eavesdropper who wishes to record the conversations
between a contact-based smart-card and its read/write machine. Successful outcomes
of the study will afford the smart-card users, holders and manufacturers a number of
potential advantages:•

a more secure channel for all communicated data between card and read/write
machine;

•

little or no additional circuitry;

•

low software overhead;

•

minimal CPU overhead; and

•

existing contact-based smart-card CPU designs may remain compliant with

IS0-7816.

19

1.3

PurposeoftheStudy

The study investigates the possibility of using mechanisms whereby channel-hopping
may be implemented economically, in terms of hardware and software, by IS0-7816
· compliant smart-cards, and to evaluate the mechanisms' effectiveness at confusing a
potential communications link eavesdropper. Various techniques will be explored, and
assessed, for randomly shuffling/hopping the valid data across several channels. The
.· study will aim to demonstrate an improvement of security offered by such "randomised
,, shuffle". mechanisms, and their cost in terms of hardware, software and CPU resources,
when used to shield data transmitted via the

contact-based

smart-card's

communications link from eavesdropping.
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1.4 .· Research Question
The main question:.

.

"Can the mechanism of channel-hopping be adapted to enhance the security of data ·
transmitted between an ISO-7816 compliant contact-based smart-card and its ;
read/write machine with minimal cost to CPU resources, hardware and software'r'

The major components of the above question are:a) "What elements of channel-hopping can be utilised in the context of an JS0-7816
compliant smart-card?"
. b) "What channels can be exercised to provide hopping routes?"
c) "Can the elements found in answer to a) be used in conjunction with the channels

Ii

found in b)'r'

d

ii

\\

\\

-:.\ ..

1.5 Summary and synopsis of the remainder of the study

Security, as defined by Landwehr et al. (1984), is a relative, qualified concept.
Qualification of security may differ when viewed from the perspective of card-issuer or
card-holder. The discussion in this chapter seeks to indicate that a vulnerable point
exists in the communications link between a contact-based smart-card, which may be
poised to succeed the credit card as an access token, and an appropriate read/write
machine with which the card is obliged to communicate. Due to this vu!nerable point,
smart-card issuers may choose, for expediency, to communicate data in unencrypted
fonn. It is noted that military communications practitioners, when faced with similar

vulnerability, have adopted a practice of channel-hopping via patterned alteration of
the canier frequency.

This se.rves to increase the complexity of monitoring or

interference and so enhances the security of their communications links. The study sets
out to answer the question of whether the channel-hopping techniques may be
successful.ly applied, whilst consuming minimal CPU resources, to contact:..based ·
smart-cards.
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Chapter two takes the fonn of a review of the relevant literature.

Previous work,

illustrated in the finn foundation of text books and augmented by the documented
research and experiences given in papers and articles, fonns the basis of guidance and
justification for the approach taken by. and substance of, the proposed study. It is
demonstrated that the underlying presence of a weak communications link may enable
more fundamental

threats,

such

as infonnation leaking.

The

nature

of

frequency/channel-hopping is explored, together with its applications, and a
justification is established for its adaptation to provide a solution to the problem
outlined in the above chapter.

Attacks typical of those which the solution is

anticipated to endure are identified, based upon knowledge of attacks rendered upon
conventional methods of coding and ciphering.

Chapter three describes the research design.

The fundamental design goals are

outlined, together with an evaluation of potential improvements recognised at this
stage. There follows the descriptions of the specific procedures to be developed in the
pilot software implementation.

Examples are provided in the form of scenarios,

accompanied by appropriate pseudo-code developed for these.

Chapter four presents the findings and results of the pilot implementation. Selection.
criteria for a suitable target system are discussed and an overview of the features
offered by the eventual target is given. The test programs of sender and receiver,
which demonstrate treatment of the design goals, are examined. Suitable extracts from
the test programs are presented~ together with their productions of randomised shuffle,
and are used to provide answers to the research questions.

Chapter five concludes the study. A summary is given of its beginnings and initial
aims; the manner in which the project framework was arrived at; the design criteria for
the pilot implementation; and, the resultant product of the randomised shuffle
implementation.

Finally, implications are discussed for current practice and future

research of the method's potential uses in the large.
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This document concludes with appendix. A, consisting of a comprehensive gtossary of
terms used; appendiic B, where implementation source code appears; and a section
where end text references used to support the study are given.
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. 2.

Review of Relevant Literature

2.1 General Literature

Torrieri (J 992, p. 291) relates that the interception of communications data may be
attempted, in general, for many diverse reasons such as: reconnaissance, surveillance,
position fixing, identification, or as a prelude to jamming.

Of these, the author

suggests that those of reconnaissance, identification and surveillance may apply to
parties interested in intercepting a smart-card's transmitted data, implying concern for
passive attacks rather than active ones as the physical nature of the smart-card's
contact to receiving socket mechanism renders undetected on-line insertion of modified
data difficult. Torrieri's described interception system includes three basic functions
which must always be achieved: detection,freque11cy estimation and direction finding.
Relating these to the context of a contact-based smart-card's half-duplex
communications link reveals that:
•

detection may be achieved by observing activity on the link, (i.e., when the signal

moves from its steady state);
•

frequency estimation may also be determined by observation.

ISO-7816-3

(JSO/IEC 7816-3, 1994, Clause 6.1. 1) mandates that cards with an internal clock
shall use a bit rate of 9600 bits per second (b.p.s.), whilst externally clocked cards
are prescribed an initial bit period (in seconds) of
•

(3 72/ external clock-freque cy); and
11

direction finding (of the transmitting party) may be discerned by recognition of

"lulls" in link activity (announcing that a change of direction is imminent) and by
examination of the conversation delimiters and/or headers which are mandated in
ISO standards (ISO/IEC 7816-3 Part 3, 1994).

As Fumy (1991) states, "It is generally regarded a simple matter to record the data

passing through a communications line without detection by the communicating
parties." Eavesdropping, or the interception and recording of data for examination,
may enter two of De Sch utter' s ( 1991) five categories, shown in Figure 2.1, into which
incidence of computer abuse may be placed: namely, data espionage and unauthorised
interception.
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Category

Example/description

Manipulatim1 of

e.g., input of false data, alteration, erasure, deterioration and/or

data

suppression of stored data or programs with fraudulent intent.

Data espionage

unlawful collection or acquisition and/or use of data.

Computer

leading to the destruction or disruption of software or

sabotage

hardware.

Unauthorised

of a computer and/or teleconununications system with

access or

infiingement of security measures.

interception
Program piracy

e.g., the infringement of the exclusive right of the owner of a
protected computer program.

Figure 2.1.

De Schutter's (1991) categories of computer abuse.·

More formally, the interception of communicated data represents an underlying threat
to system security which Ford ( 1994) has included in his hierarchy of threats. Ford's_
hierarchy indicates that underlying threats may enable more fundamental ones. Three
stages of identification or classification are necessary for assembly of the hierarchy:
namely,
•

fundamental threats, those typically associated with the confidentiality, access and

integrity of data or resources;
•

primary enabling threats, the realisation of which may lead to an enabling of the

more fundamental threats; and

•

underlying threats, the presence of which may enable more fundamental threats.

Figure 2.2, adapted from Ford's explanations, provides illustration by example of each
classification of threat.

-

,
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Chwiflcation

Type

Example/description

·. Fundamental

Information leakage-.

Information is disclosed to unauthorised entities.

tbreats

Integrity violation ~

Consistency of data is compromised through
unaulhorised editing
Legitimate access to resource is deliberately

Denial of Service -.

impeded

Primary

lllegitimate use _..,,.

Unauthorised use of resource

Masquerade_..,,.

An unauthorised entity poses as an authoric:d

enabling threats

entity, so obtaining rights and privileges of the
authorised entity
An attacker exploits security flaws or weaknesses

Bypassing controls ~

to gain access, rights or privileges
Authorisation violation

~

An entity authorised for one resource uses that

authority for unauthorised pqrpose
Underlying

Eavesdropping -.

Infonnation is revealed by monitoring
communications: e.g., by EM/RF interception

threats
Traffic analysis·~

Observation of communications traffic patterns

Indiscretions by personnel~

An authorised person discloses information to an
unauthorised person, reasons for which may
include money, favours or carelessness

Figure 2.2.

Examples or threat classification to contemporary computer
n1i:tworks (Tabulated from work done by Ford, 1994).
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As may be seen from Figure 2.2, amongst Ford's underlying threats is that of

eavesdropping, the use of which may enable the more fundamental threat of
information leakage. The digital nature of serially transmitted data streams (such as
the smart-card's communications link and RS-232 links) exhibits short rise and fall
times which correspond to high frequency signal components that, in turn, yield
considerable radiation for observation by an eavesdropper. The work of Smulders
(l 990), showed that reconstructed messages with bit error rates of approximately O. 0 I
·(l %) could be achieved reliably, sensing at a distance of between one and seven metres

when eavesdropping on shielded RS-232 cables. Now consider that the asynchronous
serial transmissions being monitored tend to be grouped in characters of seven to
eleven bits, simplifying the task of reconstructing any unknown bits by examination in
context. Notably, the equipment used in these experiments was neither expensive nor
sophisticated, comprising a standard AM/FM radio receiver, a simple whip antenna of
one metre length and a hard limiter circuit to reconstruct the digital nature of the data.
Smulders' article concludes: "the receiver and recording equipment for intercepting
RS-232 data signals are very small, simple and cheap compared with the equipment
needed for the interception of video signals. ... Because of this fuct ... we have to take
special account of the RS-232 eavesdropping possibilities in vulnerability studies."
Although the smart-card's read/write machine would not be expected to possess long
cable lengths and its voltage swings are less than those of RS-232, Smulders' work
·demonstrates that, in addition to the direct monitoring circuitry exemplified in Figure
I. 2, serial link eavesdropping is possible using external monitoring circuitry.

Herskovitz (1995, June) points out the value of permitting and observing, rather than
disrupting an enemy's communications. He cites as prime examples of this the gains
provided by the Allies' observation of enciphered enemy messages during World War
Two, after the enemy encryption mechanisms of Enigma and Purple had been cracked.
Recognising the inevitability that a communicated message needs protection,
Herskovitz (I 995, June) outlines «four basic approaches to securing the information
conveyed by a communication system ... :
I) permitting no unintentional signal radiation - signals may be bounded by metallic
waveguide or within an optical fibre;
2) minimising stray radiation ... ;
27

3) · making signal detection difficult - frequency, time or modulation coding;
4) penriitting detection but denying understanding - enciphering."
Of these, 1) and 2) may be afforded by the smart-card manufacturer's use of intrlnsic

security, described in chapter one, with respect to the situation of components used in
the card and read/write machine. Approach number 4) may be offered by application

security, also described in chapter one, when software requirements are specified by
the smart-card providers. Currently, no attempt is m,a.te by IS0-7816 compliant cards
to provide approach number 3).

2. 2 Other Literature of Significance to this Study
The field of military communications has advanced the topic of channel-hopping 1:? a
state of maturity where its methods and tenninology are now well-defined. Toirieri
·. ( 1994, p. 199) provides the following development of channel-hopping using carrier
frequencies in his description ofits fundamental concepts:
"Frequency-hopping is the periodic changing of the frequency or ·
frequency set associated with a transmission. A frequency-hopping signal
may be regarded as a sequence of modulated pulses with pseudorandom
carrier frequencies. The set of possible carrier frequencies is called the . ··
hopset. Hopping occurs over a frequency band that includes a number of, . ,
frequency channels."

:The effectiveness of channel-hopping depends upon the unpredictability of its hopping

1

pattern. Hops may accompany each communicated data packet (fast hopping) or may
be spread over several packets (slow hopping).

Furthermore, hopping may occur

across the bandwidth of a single channel; or across several disparate channels. To
analogise the contents of this last statement with respect to smart-cards might be to
hop using time-divisions on a link connected to a single card contact, or alternatively
to hop between links connected to several of the card's contacts.

A method of

combining data to be communicated with a synthesised channel-hopping pattern to
produce the channel-hopping signal is shown in Figure 2.3. Further security may be
added to the chaanel-hopping pattern, for example, by combining a secret key with the
time of day so that the pattern does not become recognisably repetitious over a
prolonged period. This method implies that both key and time of day are correctly
synchronised between sender and receiver before hopping may occur, and further
implies that the key is changed infrequently relative to the volume of a link's data
packets.
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Radar systems (themselves forming both transmitter and receiver of a conununications
system) use channel-hopping (Herskovitz, 1995, July), varying their carrier :frequency
to avoid their signals being januned rather than to avoid eavesdropping. Jamming is
also a threat to conununication systems when, for example, robust encryption prevents
an enemy making use of intercepted data. According to Greiner & Reissberg (1987)
and Herskovitz ( 199 5) transmitters must detect that they are being jammed, then
reactively switch to the next hop in order to re-establish the link. This type of hopping
-·

is known as adaptive reaction channel-hopping where communicating parties,
independently and ''on the fly", assess the probability of the next channel to settle
upon, rather than hopping according to a consistent pre-communicated pattern.
Greiner & Reissberg (1987) report that adaptive reaction systems could deal with rates
of two hops per second while providing low communication bit rates of approximately
one hundred baud. However, when compared to standard hopping rates in excess of
five hundred hops per second (Telefunken System Technik, 1993), it may be suggested
that the computation effort required for channel selection reduces data throughput.
Although Greiner & Reissberg's 1987 report may be considered "oldu, recall that the
CPUs used in many of today's smart-cards were designed in the 1980s (Townend,
1995), implying similar perfonnance to that found by Greiner & Reissberg. Thus, the
author feels it is justifiable to consider the application of a pre-defined, precommunicated hopping pattern.

As often happens, the technology devised for military purpose finds its way into
everyday commercial use. Channel-hopping no longer exists exclusively within the
domain of military communications. Dellecave (1995) reports that vendors making
products to meet the specification of the forthcoming IEEE 802.11 standard for
wireless Local Area Networks (LAN) have chosen carrier-frequency based channelhopping techniques to improve reliability. In a report on the offerings of wireless
LANs, Rigney ( 199 5) suitably sums up channel-hopping's perceived advantage: "This
spreading of the data protects the signal from eavesdropping and interference."

In addition to data, conununications networks often provide a vehicle for their own
packaged control signals. Verschuren, Govaerts and Vandewalle (1991) observe that
the data which flows through a communication network is typically twofold: being,
31
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•

user data~ and

•

protocol control infonnation (PCI) governing the communication between;
entities.

In the context of this study, the user data equates to the data presently sent from the
smart-card to its read/write machine, and for which it is the study's objective to add
protection. The PCI comprises details of the channel-hopping technique which wilt
add the protection. This may be seen as the provision of a confidentiality service that
prevents,

for

example,

unauthorised

disclosure

of information

from

the

communications link by a passive attack or eavesdropping. Verschuren et al. ( 199 I),
propose that such confidentiality protection should be considered at two levels or
layers of the communication system: namely, the application layer and the physical
layer, by the use of enciphennent or cryptography.

Cryptography, seen by Parker ( 1983) as "The premier safeguard against computer
crime", is defined by Vandewalle, Govaerts and Preneel (1991) as "the science of
techniques which make data unintelligible and unmodifiable by outsiders ... and still
accessible or verifiable by the legitimate receiver." Some smart-cards provide facilities
for encryption of data by the DES algorithm about which Vandewalle et al. (1991)
state "Concerning the security of DES there is a rather general consensus among the
cryptographic researchers that it is an extremely good algorithm with an unfortunately
small key of 56 bits.

Hence it is best used in a multi-encryption scheme (triple ·

encryption with two keys) .... "

Later in their discussion Vanderwalle et al. (1991)

acknowledge that speed of encryption and decryption is often too slow and they put
forward a hybrid scheme.

In this scheme, when speed is critical, key-exchange is

effected under a strong encryption (e.g., RSA or multi-encryption of DES) and
information exchange is effected under less onerous algorithms. Relating the scheme
to the context of the smart-card to read/write machine communications link, the key
exchange may equate to the channel-hopping pattern, transferred under strong
encryption, whilst the ensuing information exchange ~s afforded the protection of the
channel-hopping itself
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So far, the development of channelHhopping has considered that a message may be
multiplexed across many channels, according to an acceptable sequence which is either
known to, or derivable by, the transmitter and legitimate receiver. If this was the
totality of the channel~hopping implementation, then observation of all channds may
reveal the valid one. An obvious improvement would be the concurrent transmission
of both the valid message and random characters on some or all of the available
channels. However, where all channels are being monitored, automated analysis which
searches for and combines potential lexemes, may reveal the valid message.

To

obfuscate the situation, further misinformation may be offered to an interloper by
means of "ambiguity, paradox and logic of recognition" (lngleby, 1988). Broadly
speaking, equally plausible message sequences are transmitted on some or all of those
channels not being used to convey the real cata. lngleby's work is directed to speech
and image recognition where, for example, phoneme strings are assessed for possible
patterns to aid in the recognition of spoken messages. However, as Sebesta (1989)
suggests, an automated language recogniser acts on syntactic units (called lexemes)
which have been produced from a known alphabet within a known lexical specification.
Consider the following text, " 'Twas bri/lig and the slimy loves did gyre and gymbal
in the wabe ", from Lewis Carroll's Jabberwoclcy, which might be tt ansmitted

concurrently with a valid message. The transmitted material could be formed from
combinations of the text and the valid message so as to fool an automated recognition
tool scanning all received channels for lexeme possibilities.

Such applied

misinformation means that the eavesdropper must decide which is the valid message.
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· Having developed the requirements of the proposed method thus far, it is appropriate
.to identify the various fonns of attack which it could be expected to endure. For this,
the study looks toward attacks which cryptanalysts apply in their investigations of
encrypted data.

First, however, the common terminology is introduced and

conventional methods are presented in overview. Longley, Dawson & Caem' s (1994)
examination of traditional ciphers and coding techniques suggests that they may be
regarded in the following manner: in general, algorithms used do not treat the whole
volume of plaintext in one pass, and they break it up into smaller units for processing.

Ciphering techniques combine these units with a key, resulting in the production of
ciphertext, a transformation of the plaintext. Longley et al (1994) indicate that the
data may be processed at a fundamental unit ( of bit or byte) level, which is considered
as a stream cipher method or, alternatively encrypted in blocks of several fimdamenta1
units at a time: which method is known as a block cipher.

Stream ciphers are

characterised by their application of simple algorithms where plaintext and key streams
of identical length are combined to produce a stream of ciphertext identical in length to
that of the plaintext. Block ciphers typically utilise more complex algorithms where
the length of the applied key is the same as that of the block. The key may be applied
symmetrically by both communicating parties or, asymmetrically, where the algorithm
permits each party to apply a different key for their enciphering/deciphering operations.

Coding provides protection of transmitted data where symbols in the plaintext are
replaced by corresponding symbols, or groups of symbols, known only to the
legitimate communicating parties. Importantly, the product of coding yields a stream,
the length of which may differ markedly from that of the plainiext.
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The above techniques' capability of resisting attacks depends upon the secrecy of or
denial, to the cryptanalyst, of some knowledge employed in the protection method
used. Attacks may assume:
·., knowledge of the technique used, whereby security depends upon the secrecy of
the key;
•

that sufficient ciphertext is available for scrutiny;

· .•

that some plaintext is known to be associated with captured ciphertext;

•

that correspondence has been established between known plaintext and. known .
ciphertext;

•

a knowledge of the chosen language's redundancy, recognised by Shannon (l949),
which may be exploited for statistical analysis.

Sebeny and Pieprzk (1989) provide a description of common cipher techniques, .·
together with suggested fonns of cryptanalysis for each.
,.

Longley et al. (1994)

summarise the most common forms of attack, which may be used in isolation or in
combination, as:
•

key exhaustion, where attempts using many keys are made to extract the valid

· message;
•

statistical analysis where, for example, the known frequency of usage of letters in

the chosen language is used to isolate probable instances of the valid message; and
•

mathematical analysis, where the cryptanalyst tries their knowledge of algorithms

against the collected ciphertext to regain the valid message.
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2.3 Summary
The discussion in this chapter has sought to establish that, stemming from the
recognition that a communications link inevitably will be monitored, protection
measures need to be applied so that the fundamental threat of information disclosure
does not occur. The discussion has further sought to establish that the proven military
practice of channel-hopping, now entering more general use, may appropriately be
applied to the smart-card's communications link(s), affording added protection.
Hopping patterns may be generated from a combination of a secret key and, if
available, a synchronised time-of-day clock, so as to minimise decryption attempts
based upon the isolation of a repetitive key. Having surmised that "on-the-fly" or
reactive channel selection may introduce an excessive burden on the smart-card's CPU,
the concept of applying pre-arranged hopping patterns, initially communicated under
strong encryption between card and read/write machine, has been put forward as
suitable added protection for ensuing communicated data.

Requirements for the

method to be developed were concluded by proposing that applied misinformation, in
the form of apparently meaningful messages transmitted concurrently to the valid one,
may further mislead and complicate the eavesdropper's task, even when automatic
recognition is applied.

Finally, the nature of attacks to which the study's method

would be subjected were identified, drawing upon the experiences of conventional
cipher and coding techniques.

. .~

. :
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3.

· Research Design

The discussion in previous chapters suggests that data transmitted via the smart-card's .
communications link may be afforded some protection by the combination of a suitable
channel-hopping mechanism and the co-transmission of applied misinfonnation. With
regard to the eight-bit processors used in smart-cards the fundamental aim, then, is to
surround the valid message with plausible misinfonnation, accomplished in a manner
which is economical in tenns of machine resources. By plausible it is meant that the
misinformation will match as closely as possible the nature and type of the valid .·
message.

The co-transmission of such misinformation reduces an eavesdropper's

advantage of using automated lexical analysis to retrieve the valid message from the
apparently randomly shuffled transmitted text. While providing a measure of security
superior to that of transmitting data as plain-text, the method should allow the smart-

,,,-,

card processor to offer an option which, albeit less secure than encryption, does not
require encryption's attendant computational overheads.
This chapter provides a description of the basic method implemented ._and of . .J
.

•

I

enhancements to that basic method evaluated in this study ..
·... ·

.J:.:,: .
..--.

k.
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3.1 General Met/rod

For the purpose of the study, the valid messages. embedded within their accompanying
misinformation, arrive at the legitimate receiver via available channels, as a result of the
following distinct processes and considerations:
o

creation of the channel-hopping pattern;

•

communication of the channel-hopping pattern to be used in the forthcoming
communications session, in a secure manner, to the legitimate recipient;

•

selection of appropriate misinformation to transmit concurrently with the valid
message;

•

storage of, and subsequent acces~ to, the misinformation data; and

•

transmission of the messages, with valid data according to the pre-arranged
channel-hopping pattern, and with misinfonnation data co-transmitted on the
remaining channels.

Of the above list, it is to be noted that the first four items, which are perfonned once
per communications session, are concerned primarily with the organisation of the
transmitted data. This leaves the processor little additional work to perform at the
time of transmission. The situation is similar for the receiver: in order to isolate the
valid message in real-time, the legitimate receiver has only to select, according to the
pre-arranged channel-hopping pattern, the valid characters from those received.

In

other words, by following the pattern, the receiver is able to reject received
misinformation characters as they arrive.

By contrast, encrypted data must be

submitted to an ~ncryption process prior to transmission, nnd a decryption process
before the valid message may be reclaimed from the received data. These resource
consuming

preparations

accompany

each

communications session.
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transmitted

message

during

a

3.2 Specific Procedures

3.2.1 Creation or the dl.annd-bopping pattern

Recall from chapter two that hopping may occur across the bandwidth of a single
channel, or across several disparate channels. Analogies to these, in the context of
smart-cards, are that hopping may be accomplished:
•

using time-divisions on a link connected to a single smart-card contact,
whereby several logical channels are mapped onto the single physical channel of
the smart-card's communications link; or alternatively

•

by hopping between links connected to several of the smart-card's contacts,
whereby several logical channels are mapped onto several physical links
between smart-card and its read/write machine.

It is necessary to decide how many channels will be implemented within the physical

links available.

The mapping of logical to physical channels for the pilot

implementation is according to the reasoning and practical observations which follow.
•

Smart-card hardware is unlikely to support the use of more than the two
designated input/output (I/0) lines within the eight available.

•

Smart-cards which confonn to ISO-7816, i.e., those in widespread use, normally
communicate via one I/0 line;

•

While the mapping of many logical channels to one I/0 line's physical channel will
deteriorate the useful bit rate of that channel, it represents a facile mechanism by
which to demonstrate the concepts embodied in the study. Furthermore, recalling
that the bulk of the computation is performed prior to transmission, such a
mapping represents the worst-case situation for the channel-hopping mechanism
under development. Put another way, if one accepts that the organisational work is
accomplished largely prior to transmission, the availability of extra physical .
. channels will result in an increase of data throughput approximately proportional to
the ratio of the increased number of channels. ·.
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The example in Figure 3.1 shows seven logical channels, meaning that every valid
character (V) is accompanied by six misinfonnation characters (M).

IM\M\M
Figure 3.1.

V

MM Ml

Example of seven channels. In this case, the valid message
character occupies the fourth position .

.There is a need to use a fresh hopping pattern for each communication session
between card and read/write machine, thus minimising repetition of pattern usage.
Further, to minimise repetition, the pattern's length should be sufficient to disguise the
messages which need to be transferred. That is to say, longer messages need a longer
pattern than relatively short messages to eschew repetition throughout transmission.
The pattern may be filled by repeated use of a pseudorandom number generator
operating within the range of available channels. Alternatively, where a pseudorandom
number generator proves too cyclical or produces weak patterns, the hopping pattern
may be selected from tables of suitable, previously generated, patterns. An example of
a hopping pattern is given in Figure 3.2.

15
Figure 3.2.
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upping pattern of length 13 for seven channels.
5

Using the examples provided in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, each cycle of the combination of
Va1id (V) and Misinfonnation (M) characters will be transmitted as given in Figure 3.3.
If the valid message is longer than the pattern, the cycle will be repeated.
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Figure 3.3.

Cycle showing hopping pattern or length
13 over 7 channels, illustrating the
apparent randomised shuffling or the
valid data.

3.2.2 .Communication or the channel-hopping pattern to the legitimate receiver

To minimise detection where some plaintext is known by an eavesdropper, a fresh
hopping pattern is generated for each session between the smartwcard and its read/write
· machine. To obstruct unwanted eavesdroppers, the hopping pattern list (effectively thfl
"key" to the process) must be communicated under great secrecy. Whilst it is not
intended to include key management within the scope of this study, the following
·guidelines are suggested for communication of the hopping pattern to the legitimate
receiver.
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Many smart-cards provide on-card encryption routines, typicaJly that of DES/DEA.
The application of triple DES is acknowledged, by Burton, Kaliski & Robshaw (1996),
to provide high levels of security. The hopping pattern may be communicated under
such encryption, making use of the on-card DES routines and associated DES key
management facilities.

Where such on-card facilities do not exist, a DES

implementation such as that provided by Brown in Seberry and Pieprzyk {1989) may
be utilised, and key management techniques, as described by Caelli, Dawson and
Longley (1994) for symmetric ciphers, may be applied.

For the purpose of the pilot implementation, it is assumed that each legitimate
communicating party (i.e., the smart-card and its associated read/write machine) is
aware of the channel-hopping list and that communication · of the list has been
conducted in a secure manner.

Clearly, key management may be a relatively time-consuming task for the smart-card.
It is suggested that the generation and encryption of the one-off hopping pattern and
its subsequent communication to the legitimate receiver may be accomplished shortly
after the smart-card is inserted into its read/write machine. Notably, cardholders are
accustomed to delays of several seconds at this "initialisation" phase of their
anticipated transaction.
added

delay,

the

Accordingly, to hold the cardholder's attention during any
card

read/write

machine

might

display

a

suitable

promotional/welcome message.

As an alternative to the enciphered transmission of the complete hopping pattern list, it
may be considered worthwhile to take advantage of the algorithmic nature of computer
pseudo-random number generators by enciphering and communicating the seed with
. which the generator should be commenced, and the hopping pattern length. Where the
two legitimate communicating parties use the same pseudo-random number generator,
the hopping pattern may then be derived by each party applying the same seed.
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3.2.3 Selection of appropriate:imisinformation for co-transmission
The conventional application of channel-hopping, as in military radio conununications,
operates across different cani•er frequencies, taking advantage of a situation where it
may be difficult to monitor all possible frequencies simultaneously.

This study's

adaptation of channel-hopping differs markedly in that all channels may be monitored

with equal ease on the seriali link. There is, therefore, a need for the application to
surround the valid data with misinformation in which the valid data will appear
inconspicuous.

By examp1e, it is appropriate to accompany valid messages of

binary/textual/numerical

data

with

binary/textual/numerical

misinformation

respectively;

There is clearly a need to provide/generate misinformation which will camouflage all
possible types of valid data during transmission. One means of satisfying this need is
to provide prepared libraries of misinformation from which to choose before
transmission.

Smart-card application programmers may reasonably be expected to

know and/or control the type of data communicated by their applications. Thus, when
writing their applications they may be able to select, from the various types of supplied
misinformation, the type(s) most appropriate for co-transmission with their valid
message.

3.2.4 Storage of, and subsequent access to, the misinformation data

Smart-card MCUs notoriously provide little RAM: typically 128, 256, 512 or 640
bytes. However, also typically, they do provide between 8 and 20 kilobytes of ROM in
which application code and fixed data may reside. These characteristics mandate an
approach which is sparing in its use of RAM, but which may reasonably allocate
sufficient of the on-chip ROM for its purpose.

.:;

.

It .
'I

\I
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Look~up tables provide a means of rapidly accessing data, and for the pilot
implementation a small database is constructed to contain the misinformation for
transmission in non-valid message channels. Examples of textual misinformation are
given in Figure 3 .4, and these are, in fact, accessed from their ROM storage as arrays
of null terminated strings. Misinformation accompanying numeric or digital data may
either be generated in a pseudorandom fashion at the point of transmission, or libraries
of prepared misinformation may be constructed to be held in ROM.

/*string*/
char
*misinfol
char
•misinfo2

/• of the misinformation in which the valid text will be hidden*/
"Twas brillig and the s/ithy loves did gyre and gymhal in the wahe: All
mimsy were the horogoves and the mome raths outgrahe ";
"Beware the Jahberwock, my son! The jaws that bite, the claws that
catch! Beware the Juhjub bird, and shun The frumious Bandersnatch! ";
-

char
*misinfo3

"He took his vorpal sword in hand: Long time the manxome foe he
sought, so rested by the Tumtum tree, And stood awhile in thought. ";

char

''And as in ujfish thought he stood, The Jabherwock, with eyes of flame

*misinfo4

came whiffing through the tulgey wood, and burbled as it came! ";

char
*misinfo5

0ne, two! One, two.I And through and through, the vorpal blade went

11

snicker snack! He left it dead, and with its head, he went galumping
back

11;

-

Char
•misinfo6

Figure3,4.

"And hast thou slain the Jabherwock? Come to my arms, my beamish
boy! Ofrabjous day! Cal/ooh! Ca/lay! He chortled in his joy.

Examples of textual misinformation.

11;

Quoted from Lewis

Carrol's Jabberwocky.

The study draws, in part, upon an adaptation of the teclmiques devised by Ingleby
(I 988) for the introduction of ambiguity into a transmitted message. The ambiguity is
introduced by the concurrent transmission of appropriate misinformation and thus may
lead to confusion of an eavesdropper's logic of recognition. In keeping with Ingle by' s
examples the author has quoted and used Carrol's works for the purposely designed
ambiguity they contain. For the reader's information Lewis Carrol was the pen name
of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (1832~1898), a mathematician who, according to
44

-Everyman's Encyclopaedia (1973), · studied and _subsequently lectured _at -Oxford
-University between 1854 and 1881.

Amongst his publications were mathematical

-_ papers and several works of fiction._
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Transmission of the message

Having completed the previous steps, the valid message may now be transmitted using
a hopping pattern such as in Figure 3.3. Assuming a textual message is desired to be
co-transmitted with misinfonnation such as is illustrated in Figure 3.4, the following
simple algorithm may be applied.
initialise the variables used,·
for (each character in the valid message) loop
for (each channel) loop
if ( this channel = this hopping pattern) then
transmit next character from valid message;
else
transmit next character from randomly selected misi,iformation string;
end if,·
end loop;
advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion; ·
:.:'.:
end loop;

Using the above algorithm, channels are filled with characters as foUows. The channel
coinciding with the current element of the hopping pattern is allocated the next
character from the valid message. Note that each remaining channel is supplied with
the next character from a pseudo-randomly selected misinfonnation string/datastore.
This prevents two identical valid messages being co-transmitted with identical
misinfonnation, further increasing the apparent randomness of the production.
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. The algorithm

for retrieving the valid message from the stream of received· characters
,.

is as follows:

initialise the variables used;
while (characters are an-iving) loop
for (each channel) loop
if (this channel = this hopping pattern) the,,
.
add next received character to received 1t_1essage;
else
·.
discard next received character;
end if;
end loop;
end loop,·

3.3 Potential Enhancements

Ha,ving established the functionality of the basic fonn of channel-hopping coupled with
applied misinformation, the following potential enhancements, intended to minimi_se
repetition, are considered:
•

addition of a time-of-day-clock modifier (see Figure 2.3)

So

that identical valid

messages transmitted at different times cannot have the same hopping pattern;
•

maximise usage of the set of misinformation by swapping applicable consonants (or
groups of consonants) contained in the misinfonnation at the moment of
transmission;

•

random changing of the bit order of characters transmitted, i.e., establishing a
pattern for hopping bits to be superimposed upon the hopping pattern applied to
the characters on the link. If this were to be effected upon all valid characters, it is
possible that the entire message may be camouflaged within binary data.

The above listed enhancements will be discussed in tum.

47

3.3.1 Addition of a time-of-day-clock modifier

As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the time of day clock modifier may be used to prevent
identical valid messages being transmitted with the same hopping pattern. In order to
implement a reliable clock, however, generally requires an interrupt driven timer, a
feature which is absent from typical smart-card CPUs. Accordingly, this enhancement
was seen as impractical to realise within the context of a smart-card and was not
pursued.

3.3.2 Maximise usage of the set of misinformation by swapping applicable
· consonants at the moment of transmission.

Possibilities for implementing such swapping include:
•

selections employing a pseudorandom derived swap; and

•

selection of exchangeable characters by reference to their normal frequency of
occurrence in the current language.

Exemplification of the effect of consonant swapping is to be found in Lewis Carrol's
Jabberwocky in the word "slithy". Carrol's example shows that an 'm' may have been
exchanged with the pair "th" to present a word which at first sight appears Eng1ishlike. Note that similar effect might have been achieved by replacing the 'm' with 'h'

(slihy), 'd' (slidy), and so on. Importantly, a lexical analyser would probably accept
these as plausible words. This enhancement was deemed to offer improvement and
was implemented in the study. The modified transmission algorithm appears below~
with modifications appearing in bold text.
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initialise the variables used;
for (each character in the valid message) loop
for (each channel) loop
if ( this channel = this hopping pattern) then
transmit next character from valid message;
else
get next character from randomly selected misinformation string;
if (it is a consonant) then
randomly swap it with another consonant;
end if;
transmit resultant character;
end if;
end loop;
.advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion;
end loop;

Note that this enhancement requires no. further processing to be··accompHshed by the·
legitimate receiver.

For simplicity, consonant swapping was limited to that of single character and all
consonants, excepting those deemed inappropriate for swapping (i.e., [q,w,x]), were
considered as equal candi.dates for swapping.

3.3.3 Random changing of the hit order of characters transmitted

As an enhancement, such a technique offers two potential advantages: all transmitted
data now becomes binary in nature, removing the need for such carefully selected

misinfonnation to be applied to enveloping the valid message; and, it increases the
complexity of the eavesdropper's task.
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Disadvantages may also accompany the method, however, dependant upon the level of
granularity of bit re-arrangement imposed upon the transmitted data. Where bit rearrangement is effected at character level, it may be shown to be a relatively facile task
to perform an automated search of all possible bit combinations. All or part of the
intercepted message may be examined in this way, possibly leading to recovery of the
· ·; bit re-arrangement pattern. Where bit re-arrangement is effected on a wider scope,
e.g., the entire message, exhaustive searches become more time-consuming, but the
demands upon sender and legitimate recipient rise accordingly.

Notably, the

incorporation ofthis technique, with bit-order rearrangement effected on a wide scope,
can be seen to deviate from the original operation where the organisational work is
acccomplished ahead of the transmission, and where little subsequent work is required
of the receiver to extract the valid message.

As discussed previously, an application programmer may appropriately select the
nature of misinformation for co-transmission. In like manner, the decision to apply
additional bit re-arrangement, with its attendant CPU resource costs, could be left to
the application programmer's discretion.

The algorithm required to implement bit re-arrangement, at character level, is given
below, with those modifications required to augment the basic method illustrated in
bold text.

initialise the variables used;
for (each character in the valid message) loop
for (each channel) loop
if ( this channel = this hopping pattern) then
get next character from valid message;
else
get next character from randomly selected misinformation string;
end if;
re-a"ange next character's bit order according to next bit-order pattern;
transmit resultant character;
end loop;
advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion;
end loop;
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The algorithm for the legitimate receiver

is given below, again with modifications

highlighted in bold text:

initialise the variables used,·
while (characters are arriving) loop
..
for each channel loop
if (this channel = this hopping pattern) then :' .:
get nert received character
re-a"ange received character's hit order according to next bit-order pattern;
add to received message;
else
discard next received character;
end if;

end loop;
endloop;

3.4 Summary

The components of design for the pilot implementation whereby transmitted data may
be protected by shuffling it across several logical channels in randomised fashion, and
enveloping it within applied plausible misinfonnation, have been described.

The processes and considerations contributing to the communication of the protected
data were developed to yield the basic design. During the production of the basic
design, potential improvements were identified.

These enhancements to the basic

design have been discussed and evaluated for inclusion in this implementation or future
studies.

Scenarios of the basic design and the adopted enhancements have been

presented with their resultant algorithms.

The design, espousing economy of

implementation, is respectful of the basic level of facilities offered by smart-card CPUs.
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.4. Implementation and Findings
· Recall, from the previous chapter, that our fundamental aim is to intersperse the valid
message within a cocoon of plausible misinformation, in order to confuse a potential
eavesdropper.

This concealment is to be accomplished in a manner which is

economical in terms of the machine resources available from an eight-bit CPU
exhibiting features similar to those found in contemporary smart-cards.

Design

decisions are required for the selection of appropriate software tools to perfonn the
specific components of the implementation, and for the choice of a suitable target
system which is adequately equipped to produce a test program illustrating the
scenarios previously identified.

4.1 Selection of the software tools and target system
For reasons of availability, economy, and its feature-similarity to typical smart-card
CPUs, a proprietary Motorola evaluation system centred on Motorola's 68HCI I
(MC68HC 11) eight-bit microcontroller was employed as a target system. Usage of the
evaluation system's hardware was constrained, for the study's purpose, to those
facilities normally found within a smart-card CPU. The constraints precluded the use
of interrupts (e.g., for timing purposes) and/or the on-chip serial ports for data
transmission.

Similar reasons prompted the initial use of the ImageCraft C cross-compiler/assembler
for the MC68HC11, as the vehicle for code generation.

The ImageCraft C cross-

compiler, however, proved to be incomplete in its support for the ANSI C standard.
Limitations caused by such non-compliance prompted the employment of a Hi-Tech
cross compiler/assembler for the later stages of implementation. Notably, neither the
ImageCraft nor the Hi-Tech assembler was found to be fully compliant with
Motorola's assembly language syntax, particularly in the support of macros, although
this has not impacted upon the implementation executables.

. if"'.' ... .

..._____________s_2_______________.!
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Timing measurements were made using a Hewlett Packard Model HP54600A one
·. hundred MHz digital storage oscilloscope, Serial Number 3334031110, supplied by ·
Edith Cowan University.

4.2 Implementation of the study

. The design discussed in chapter three suggests three scenarios to be implemented:
•

the transmission of the valid message, shuffled and encapsulated within selected
applied misinformation - this is labelled the basic method;

·•

the basic method, enhanced by the random substitution of consonants contained
within the applied misinformation., thus maximising re-use of the misinformation set
- this is labelled the substitution method; and

•

the basic method, augmented by the random re-arranging/scrambling of the bit
order of transmitted characters - this is labelled the scrambled method.

It may be seen that variations and combinations of the above scenarios may be
employed to gain further improvement.

However, for the purpose of the study,··

implementation has been limited to these scenarios.

The implementation concerning each of these will now be presented in turn, with every·
one being discussed in tenns of:
•

its requisite implementation code in the C language;

• · the test data chosen to demonstrate facilities offered by the technique; and
•

the resultant production given by the application of the scenario's randomised
shuffle together with its associated applied misinformation.

Timing measurements, yielding a measure of CPU resource usage, observed for each
scenario will also be presented for differing data-lengths. Annotated source code
listings may be found in Appendix B.
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4.2.1 The basic method

It is appropriate to view the code of the basic method, in the.:68HC1 I target system, as
providing two interfaced layers: namely,
•

fundamental serial communications support; and

•

the Randomised-,Shuffle implementation.

In keeping with smart-card technology, the asynchronous se1ial communications
implemented for this study are effected by the precisely-timed toggling on/off of a bit
connected to one of the target MCU's Input/Output (1/0) ports.

Synchronisation is

necessary between communicating devices and, by convention, those employing
asynchronous serial techniques align themselves using the transitions of each
character's start bit. Once the two parties have become synchrorused, each successive
bit of the commurucated character is sampled with reference to the period elapsed from
the character synchronisation point. Clearly, for this technique to work, the jitter (the
variation from the anticip13ted sample time) for each bit transition must not be
excessive. Such exactitmJe in timing mandated the use of assembly language for the
serial communications support layer.

A

simple function-oriented

interface,

incorporating register-based parameter passing, is presented to the RandomisedShuffi e layer.

The serial commurucations support layer implementation remains

constant for all three scenarios, and its source code was supplied by a third party (see
Acknowledgements). This code plays no part other than providing. the passage of
characters to/from the target system in timely manner and would, in any case, be
already present in the smart-card's existing software. As a consequence of this, the
serial communications support Jayer is discussed no further.

During testing, it became apparent that the Pseudo-Random Number Generation
(PRNG) function, called rand(), supplied with the C compiler introduced considerable
delays (approximately one-half a character's transmission time) when used to select the
channel for each misinfonnation character to be transmitted. This PRNG acts upon,
and furnishes as a result, a thirty-two bit integer. Whilst today's contemporary thirtytwo bit CPUs provide hardware rapid multiplication and addition instructions,
facilitating similar linear congruential thirty-two bit calculations on smart-card eight-bit

54
:~ i

CPUs takes considerably longer to perfonn. Furthermore, such a linear congruential
method, implementing an affine relationship based upon two Jarge prime constants, is
difficult to separate into discrete manageable components. However, there exists
another category of PRNG which uses a shift register. For the purpose of this study,
this type of PRNG is attractive as its register may be shifted during the idle periods that
a smart-card's CPU endures during bit transmission of characters. Importantly, such a
. shift register mechanism operates at a fundamental level of one bit at a time: thus,
permitting the interweaving of the bit-shifts within several of the aforementioned
discrete idle periods. Put another way, concurrent with the transmission of a character,
the CPU may usefully be occupied in preparing the next pseudo-random number.
Scheier (1992) proposes a bit-shift PRNG mechanism whc:reby the incoming bit's state
is determined by inspection of bits according to a polynomial of z3' + z6 + 24 + 22 + 21

+ 2°, for which the C code is presented in Figure 4.1.

An explanation of the effective

and optimised use of polynomials within bit~shift mechanisms, albeit for cyclic ·
redundancy check applications, is provided in Kientzle (1997).

static unsigned long random_seed = Ox 1273678 IL;
int random_bit( void)
{

random_seed""
(((

(random_seed >> 31) //XOR with bit 31
"(random_seed>> 6) //XOR with bit 6
,;(random_seed >> 4) //XOR with bit 4
A(random_seed >> 2) //XOR with bit 2
"(random_seed » l) //XOR with bit l
11 (random_seed) //XOR with bit O
& OxOOOOOOOl) //isolate resultant bit 0
« 31) //align resultant bit with bit 31
I (random_seed >> I)); //and move it back into bit 31 of random_seed
.

.

return random_seed & OxOOOOOOOl; //then, return the "random''-tiit .
)

Figure 4.1.

C code to implement Scheier's (1992) polynomial-based 'shift ·
register PRNG.

·. l
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Notably, Scheier's mechanism inspects (via an exclusive-OR} the state of six bits of the
thirty-two bit register random_seed, lending itself.well to optimisation for a CPU with
only eight bit registers. The author's highly optimised assembly code for this appears
in Appendix B. Interwoven within the ten bits (eight data bits, plus one parity and one
stop bit) of each transmitted character, the code was found to be rapid enough to
generate a thirty-two bit pseudo-random number. As the basic method requires only
three-bit pseudo-random numbers for each misinformation character's channel
selection, there remains a redundancy sufficient to support transmission rates many
times higher than the ninety-six hundred b.p.s. used in the study.
The basic Randomised-Shuffle implementation, for convenience, was implemented
using the C language. For the reader's convenience, the pseudo-code for the basic
method appears in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.

;J
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· initialise the variables used;'
for (each character in the valid message) loop ·
· for (each channel) loop
if (this channel = this hopping pattern) then
transmit next character from validmessage,e/se
transmit next character from randomly selected misinformation string;
endij,end loop,·
advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion;
end loop;
Figure 4.2

Pseudo-code for the basic Randomised-Shuffle method
(Transmission).

initialise the variables used;
while (characters are arriving) loop
for (each channel) loop
if (this channel ::: this hopping pattern) then
add next received character to received message,- ·..
else
discard next received character,·
end if,·
end loop,·
end loop,·

Figure 4.3

Pseudo-code for the basic Randomised-Shuffle method
(Reception).

4.2.1.1 Implementation code/or the basic method
· • Iti.s assumed that any variables external to the subprogram(s) may be deemed to be in
an initialised and usable state prior to the subprogram(s) being invoked.

Relevant

pseudo-code, entered in comment form within the ensuing C code extracts, has been
italicised and boldened for clarity.
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The functionality of the scenario,s implementation has been encapsulated within a C
function entitled ''put_combined_message", featured in Figure 4.4.
//Subprogram
//purpose
II
II
//return
//parameters
//side-effects

: put_combined_message
: sends the valid char, together with its
: surrounding misinfonnation characters
: out of the serial port VO link
: none
: lhe_valid_message: points to start of valid message
: none

void put_combined_messagc( char • the_valid_message)
{int this_hopping_pattern = 0,
the_length = strlen(the_valid _message),
current_cbar;
//for (each character in the valid message) loop
for ( current_char=O; current_char < the_Iength; current_chart+). ·. ·

{int this_channel;
//zero_channels_already_used
memset( channels_already_used, 0, MAX_CHANNEL.;1);
IIfor (each channel) loop...

for (this_channel=O; this_channel < MAX_CHANNEL; lhis_channel++)
{ 1/"if(this_channel =this hopping pattern) then .. ,
if (this_channel === hopping_pattemf this_hopping_panem])
{ /hransmit next character from valid message
put(the_valid_message[current_char));
}

else
{ lhransmit next character from randomly selected misinformation string
put( get_next_misinfo_char( ));
}//if
}//for
//advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion
if(++this_hopping_pattem >= MAX_PATTERN)
this_hopping_panern = O;
. }//for
}

Figure4.4

Subprogram to transmit the combined valid message and

misinformation.
It may be seen, from the code

in Figure

4.4, that

the

subprogram

put_combined_message relies upon data held in an external array 'hopping_yattem{]'
and a further subprogram get_next_misinjo_char. The former, as its name alludes,
contains the hopping pattern understood by both transmitter. and legitimate recipient,
and the latter is presented in Figure 4.5.
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.. :··.··:::;,:

: get_next_misintb_char
//Subprogram
: gets next character from randomly selected
//pwpose
: misinfonnation siring.
II
: the next misinformation char ( typed to byte)
//return
: none
//parameters
: The array 'channe]s_already_usedl]' has the appropriate enl!y updated,
//side-effects
: signifying which misinfonnation strings have already been used .
II
: during the current cycle of transmitting an
II
'.
: enveloped valid character.
II
II
byte get_next_misinfo_char( )
{//randomly choose a nwnber from within the range of available channels
int misinfo_selected = next_rand % (MAX_CHANNEL-1);
//if this channel has been previously used for accompanying
//tlte valid channel, lhen choose the first a,m.ilable 'free' channel
while (channels_alrcady_used [misinfo_selected))
{misinfo_selected += l;
if (misinfo_selected >= (MAX_CHANNEL-I))
misinfo_selected = O;
}//while

//record the usage of this channel
channels_already_ used[misinfo_selected J= 1;
/Jbefore returning with lhe next char from this channel
return (next_char_fro111(misinfo_selected));
}

Figure 4.5.

Implementation code for obtaining the next misinformation
character within one hopping cycle.

Referring to Figure 4.5 it can be seen that, in addition to choosing randomly a
misinformation channel (whose next character will accompany the character from the
valid message) it is necessary to record that the channel has been used. In the case that
the channel has already been used, the next available channel is selected in sequential
fashion.

The array channels_already_used[] records usage of misinformation

characters for the cycle of transmitting a complete set of misinformation characters
with each successive character from the valid message.

Finally, subprogram

get_next_misinfo_ char is dependent upon the function next_char.....from (Figure 4.6)
which, as its name suggests, gets the next character from the misinformation channel
selected. The function next_char__from relies upon the array misinfo__pos[J to record
the currently available position of the next misinfonnation character within each of the
misinformation strings.
59

· //Subprogram
: next_char_from
: gets the next misinformation character to
. //purpose
II
: be transmitted, selected from tht: available
: misinformation strings
II
: next misinformation character
//return
//parameters
: misinfo_selectcd (in mode): identifies the
: misinformation string from which the char
II
: is to be taken
II
: updates misinfo_pos[J, a record of the last
//side-effects
: char used from each misinformation string
II
II
char next_char_from(int misinfo_selected)
{char next_misinfo _char~
int index;
//retrieve position of the next available character from this channel .
index= misinfo_pos(misinfo_selected];
·
//obtain the character indexed by this position
next_misinfo_char = misinfo_channels[misinfo_selected][index);
//record next available position
index+=!;
//applying bounds so as not to iudex outside the misinfo string
if (index>= misinfo_len[misinfo_selected])
{index= O;
}

//record this updated index
misinfo_pos(misinfo_selected] = inde~
return next_misinfo_char;
}

Figure 4.6

Retrieving the next available misinformation character,· then .·
updating indexing information variables,

.4.2.1.2 Test data and resultant productions.
Two differing sets of test data are presented, together with their output from the
implementation for selections of applied misinfonnation.

In each case the

microcontroller has been programmed to transmit first the hopping pattern (generated
using the C compiler's pseudo-random number generator) and, second, the valid
message, purely as an aid to clarity of demonstration.
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Figure 4.7 shows a batch of textual data .subjected to the randomised shuffle and
accompanied by the textual misinfonnation featured in Figure 3.4. It may be seen that
the valid message, a complete verse taken from Lewis Carroll's "The Walrus and the
Carpenter", blends into its envelope of accompanying misinfonnation.
The pattern is: 2325335611003
The message is: The sun was shining on the sea, shining with all his might: he did his very best to

make the billows smooth and bright and Utls was odd, because it was the middle of the night
The output is: HAITOABwenhnendwee das at , hsoraeatubossr knwtoi li lw hlnhlat eisu s hi
ogJO fu asvfniehao bsbrins,hlndep ratiawilnwlthnhgo o!o cs i;:wu t ko,nognAsh In retdd imlh y It
thae ihes nbyh b s rotneehso!taroauogv,w n do ohcs Tc:sd,ak h h?ideL n noTid injh dn Ctaego
hggw yr mstJ iawoermbiu cthebg tlaaoh eh, t ntrhwmd a o tbyclil cgh a itemkhm,er aibn,vm wxoss
!ti eor, hpm mtmeiaichn lgycf he yobtlbtehaec: lew saa hh sdmeeoiw e fat s dhwh bs oaifeentd :bu!
g atoyAhmch elslilit ,snltc i chsaOcvmmok i!eerfm cryr rsB eaew yb wshsbwateinjresfoaereutdfck
s ie n! ttb ghodtyh ea et tHmy!Jhch arkeu boeClb o ujeTartugfuolmlthgbh oe t otoi bvuheblimhr e
lisdt I drtelCa,euan oadaeldlwls,g n, te adsh Ayaym sn!enh do dwu oo Hmweotsontdhl mTotce ,o
hah hrcdnao nira d fldatt bhslrwsrhbe uimduih gilc robaohieutuUd ne, gsi ra hndB i hnastbdaaen h
s ej d wtoTeeouihniywrtgss.hta ntc swaA.g ab taanmldsrcHeu i !he lomhl tAapld noidsBigen,dto
kg w ata abrenhsbhocda eia usic uk n tt hhs vsolccOuerna f fiisJpean,aiUi s b ltbtwt hhhs
eawrtwoeyso h! wttooJr hcdu aoe gvObken, bihctnmes m,ri hhd wdye aotd.idsnl cw osekdotgn:? I
o yl oAfoLr n eoCd t , Tdonhahg me cenTt t hd hr tnjieagimo o euJw gims hmgaty tbhbhlb .taeehac

Figure 4. 7.

Textual valid data enveloped within textual misinformation.
A hopping pattern length of 13 was distributed across 7 channels.
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The pattern is: 2325335611003
The message is: 01234567890 l 234567890l23456789012345678901234567890123 456789
The output is:
HAOTOABwenlnendw2e das at 3, h4oraeat5bossr k6wtoi ti7!8 hlnhl9t eiOu s hilogJO fu
a2vfnie3ao bsbr4ns,hl5dep rat6awit7wlthnh8o o!o cs9ewu t kO,loghAsh21n re3dd imt4 y Jt tha5
ihes6nbyh b 7 rotn8ehsoltaro9uogv0w n dolohes Tc:2d,ak h 3?4deL n 5oTid 6njh d7 Ctaego
h8gw yr9mst.J iaOoennblu ethebg 2taao3 eh, t4ntrhwmd 5 o tbye6i7 cgh a8itemk9m,er aObn,vm
wxols lti2eor, hp3 mtme4aiehn 15ycf 6e yob7Ibtehaee81ew saa9

Figure 4.8.

Numeric valid data enveloped within textual misinformation.
A hopping pattern length of 13 was distributed across 7 channels.

The set oftest data depicted in Figure 4.8, shows the results of numeric data, subjected
to the randomised shuffle technique, and enveloped within the misinformation
illustrated in Figure 3.4. It is evident that the numeric data is conspicuous against the
surrounding misinfonnation, emphasising the need for an appropriate choice of data
with which to camouflage the valid message.

The pattern is: 2325335611003
The message is: Ol 234567890l234567890123456789012 34567890l234567890123456789
The output is:
~50422425114645725748619233100348499985567375596630503774852417491171103916911
1666323612609733089433047855752693!69456286775890118766638369309978809!0958512
09633326253940193838675315376319221378068881393952529159205035]217406637821909
154394711299516802641175476903371888809649666178805998711344188442469539180244
3538795251128199617474]1580045694975250067258365127673265239323443984203947847
555106128187794696272882904549

Figure 4.9.

Numeric valid data enveloped within numeric misinformation.
A hopping pattern length of 13 was distributed across 7 channels.

The same numeric data, this time enveloped in numeric data, is shown in Figure 4.9
and it may be seen that the valid data blends absolutely into the surrounding
misinfonnation.
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4.2.l.3 Timing Data
.. Observations for timing of application of the basic method for various message lengths
are recorded in Figure 4.10. The times were measured using a hopping pattern of
length thirteen, time division multiplexed across seven logical channels, within the
·bandwidth provided by one physical channel at a bit rate of ninety-six hundred bits per
second (b.p.s.). Each character's transmission is perfonned according to a protocol of
eight data bits, one stop bit and an even parity bit and, including the time necessary for
setting up the simulated smart-card's 1/0 link, consumed 1.35ms.
Valid Message
Length
{characters)

1
8

16
24
Figure 4.10.

Process only of Process only of Process+
Receiver (ms)
Transmission
Transmitter
(ms)
(ms)
24
14
4.5
0.32
24
40
2.6
119
24
69
4.7
223
24
346
7.2
109
Timing data observed for the basic method or Randomised- ..
Shuffle and Applied Misinformation.
Method Setup
Time (ms)

Note that the transmission time includes the transfer of the number of valid characters
times the number of channels.
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4~2.2 The substitution method,
Recall from chapter two, relying upon a characterMoriented variation of Ingleby's
(1988) "ambiguity, paradox and logic of recognition", that it may be possible to fool an
automated examination tool by the production of an enveloping text with nonsensical
combinations of lexemes. Example was given, in chapter three, showing consonant
substitution producing variations of the word "slimy,, as "sliby" or

''s/idy".

Examination of the consonant set in the English language (i.e., all letters not in [a, e, i,

o, u]) suggests that those in [b, c, d, f. g, h, j, k, I, m, n, p, r, s, t, v, w, x, z] appear to
be interchangeable. The letters [q, y] are not included in the interchangeable set as 'q'
normally appears accompanied by 'u', while 'y' often behaves similarly to the letter 'i'
arid is perceived by the author as a pseudo-vowel.

To reduce repetition of the

· available misinfonnation text enveloping its diffused valid message, an implementation
is presented whereby consonants from the chosen subset are randomly substituted for
each other.

4.2.Z.1 Additional implementation code required for the random substitution of
consonants.

The suitably modified C function,

'"put_combined_message", is featured in Figure .. ··

4.11. .
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//Subprogram
//pllIJ>Ose

: put_combined_message
: sends the valid char, together with its
: surrounding misinfonnation characters
: out of the serial port 1/0 link
: none
: the_valid_message: points to start of valid message
: none

II
II
//return
//parameters
//side-effects
II
void put_combined_message(char •the_valid_message) ·
{int this_hopping_patlem = o.
current_char,
this_channel,
the_length = strlen(the_va1id_messagc);
char the_char;

I/for (each character in the valid message) loop
for ( cwrent_char=O; current_char < the_length; current_char++)

{//zero_channe1s_already_ used
memset( channels_already_used, 0, MAX_ CHANNEL-I);
·
IIfor (each channel) loop...
for (this_channel=O; Uus_channcl < MAX_CHANNEL; this_channel+!-)
{ llif(lhis_channel = this hopping pattern) then...
·
if (this_channel == hopping_pattem(this_hopping_patteml)
'
{ I/transmit next character from valid message
put(the_valid_message[current_char]);
}

else
{ I/get next character from randomly selected misinformation string
the_char= get_next_misinfo_char( );
//if iJ is a consonant, randomly swap it with another consonant
put{ swap_consonant( the_char)); lhransmit resultant character
}//if
}//for

!!advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion
if(++this_hopping_pattem >= MAX_PATI'ERN)
this_hopping_pattern = O;
}//for
}

Figure 4.11.

The C function, ''put_combined_ message", suitably modified .to
swap consonants within the misinformation text, ,. thereby
extending that text's usage.

It may be seen that subprogram "swap~consonant" is used to return a character
which, if applicable, is a substitute.

The test of applicability is that the original

misinformation-character is a consonant.
detailed in Figure 4.12,

The mechanism of

"swap_consonant",

perfom1s the consonant substitution, if, and only if, the

original character belongs to the set of swappable consonants. Note that the case
(upper /lower) ofthe original character is preseived through the swap.
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//these consonants are easily swapped
.· char •interch:ingeable_consonants = 0 bcdfghjklmnprstvz,"; ·

"-----------------

. .. //Subprogram
: swap_consonant
: ifthe_charpassed in is a (swappable)
//p•irpo.se
II
: consonant, randomly chooses a
II
: consonant with which it is swapped.
//return
: if able to swap the_char, retwns
II
: the substitute consonant; else
: returns the_char
II
: the_char (in mode): a candidate character
//parameters
: for swapping with another consonant
II
. //side-effects
: none
II
char swap_consonant(char the_char)
{

char temp = tolower( the_char), //change to lower case for comparisons
•index = interchangeable_consonanls;
·
1/ifthe_char is a consonant, randomly swap it wi1J, another consonant

while(•index)
· · { if( *index=::: temp)

{ temp= interchangeable_consonanls(next_rand % consonants_lenglh];
//before returning, preserving the case of the original char
retwn (is_upper(the_char) ? toupper(temp) : temp);
}

else
{ index++;
}//if

}//while
1/couldn 't swap, so return the original char
return the char;
·
·· ·
}

Figure 4.12~

Mechanism for random swapping of consonants.·

·,
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4.2.2.2 Test daJa and resultant productions
Several productions from the "swap_consonant" subprogram, following submission of
the word "tidy", appear in Figure 4.13.
Productions from "tidy":
lily
vihy
mihy
miky

pijy
riby
jiky
nizy
licy
pivy

Figure 4~13.

Productions of the consonant-swapping r_outine, using the word .
"tidy" as original data.

Figure 4. 14 shows a batch of textual data, a complete verse taken from Lewis Carroll's

"The Walros and the Carpenter", subjected to the substitution method.
The pattern is: 2325335611003
The message is: The sun was shining on the sea, shining wilh all his might: he did his very

best to make lhc billows smooth and bright and lhis was odd, because it was the middle of
the night.
The output is: JFTAJOAhsehfweade wle zba, jtsoa asouenndz wnnil ori rnf dpt a
zgeisdu mi Bn cOopans uzaeh ibozk,igrk nnkcvzbjaa i wwinkjgo fghro! elb opwmu
ognAk,omg se mctti kcfhy n Pa iedmhlr ynce osfd kpeoetboa!pvaucd ,owvozo ej c:D tsrab,
nh?isesF Mn iov is h lcnmaVne w gboclk Vyllt iwaoeecilu rvprket daoha cfvn ,rpt lwa
efyo kl lmgd ill deairh,a zpeiljt v, gwsovxop ied,sczmm deieabi c yrg eth
jozytjkneaetb:cwa cea sh gltoee wie saj I dd rlwdea ieomvmdu:rvvoa g Abhch yljvenia,
msp vci I dlraOvkfj ioleer etljyz pnV eayw ebzj pwcwmiezlaeesscaoctuthhc p iheh!
slblpyojk v eajyepmCGecpl a k zujeGeh odo aTesujtdnouufglvhzmmv e oo uri cosdpbleni
nen i!j cl kkbelGa, uezaoaedphvaw,szc t,a lz esh aAyyml!em fwmvor ouot N tjotwcofvh ir
od,re Nn rao vpezn ao ziadhzfmdal wb nkld mehuhidji sug boizcauihoetupt hhni,c v fg as
spa miHn arjdaefrc vi go w tveeoBuihltiyzgwm sm.azc fz vc wA.aaj hp uagfPfskegcie urld
otp JpA nkdaiotdjiCose,crg dw ma ab abgcnhffdice oapap uifug It cj svhjOeeeous da pg
fK.iepniaali,tzhvi sh bwtcjhwen abwl.Y.iocsw oj lslForo h aouvkepOzvp r,c eipejmehv h vi,
wyd cpci agedofs lmwk joerdotfl?: k y !o o ftRoA g de Lotn,oLn h jlat 2'.deepe lb t t pimne z
oirojawieuLg b fhtasyv tgtz td j. leaeate

Figure 4.14. Textual valid data enveloped within textual misinformation of
which the consonants have been randomly swapped. A hopping
pattern length of 13 was distributed across 7 channels;
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4.2.2.3 Timing Data
Observations for timing of application of the substitution method, for various message
lengths are recorded in Figure 4.15. The times were measured using a hopping pattern
of length thirteen; time division multiplexed across seven logical channels, within the
bandwidth provided by one physical channel at a bit rate of ninety-six hundred bits per
second (b.p.s.). Each character's transmission is performed according to a protocol of
eight data bits, one stop bit and an even parity bit and, including the time necessary for
setting up the simulated smart-card's 1/0 link, consumed I.35ms.
Valid Message
Length
(characters)
1

Method Setup
Time (ms)

8

16

24
24

24

24

24

Process only of Process only of.
Transmitter
Receiver (ms)
(ms)
8
0.32
72
2.6
129
4.7
205
7.2

Process+
Transmission
(ms)
18
151
285
439

Figure 4.15. Timing data observed for the substitution method.
Note that the transmission time includes the transfer of the number of valid characters
times the number of channels.
. i:.....'.
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.· . 4.2;3 The scrambled method.

Recall from the previous chapter that, by application of this enhancement, whereby the
bit order of transmitted characters is re-arranged, the eavesdropper's task is made
more complex and, as all transmitted data now becomes binary in nature, the
application programmer may not need to select with such care the co-transmitted
misinfonnation text.

For the reader's convenience, the enhanced pseudo-code is
.

presented in Figures 4. 16 and 4. 17.
initialise the variables used;
for (each character in the valid message) loop
for (each channel) loop
if (this channel = this hopping po/tern) then
get next character from valid message;
else

get next character from randomly selected misinformation string;
ffldm
.
re-arrange next character's hit order according to next hit-order pattern; .
transmit resultant character,·
end loop;
advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion;
end loop;

. Figure 4.16.

Pseudo-code for transmission using the scrambled method.

· initialise the variables used;
while (characters are arriving) loop
for (each channel) loop
· if (this_channel = this hopping pattern) then
get next received character
re-arrange received character's bit order according to next bit-order pattern;
add to received message,·
else
discard next received character:
end if;
end loop,·
end loop,·

· Figure 4.17..

l 1seudo~code for reception using the scrambled method .
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· 1.2.J.l iJdditional implementation code requiredf~;:the random changi,ig of the.·

·bit order oftransmitted characters.
Bitre~arrangernent, within each character, was performed according tll the.algorithm • •.
in Figure 4.18.

_··~.~.- .-.
:

for (each bit in the char) loop

:·.\. ,~

;; .·.

if (the bit is set) then
set its substituted bit in the re-arranged character;
end if;
end loop~
advance to next bit re-arrangement pattern in cyclic manner;

.. I·

t
.'·.,.~

.

, _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ·:I·-·.

}figure 4•.18. Algorithm for re-arrangement or bits in each transmitteJi character.
In keeping ·withJhe study's previous algorithms applied to the transmitted data, the
granularity of data subjected to the bit re-arrangement algorithm has been maintained
· at character level. Modifications· and additions to the fundamental implementation ·
code are portrayed in Figures 4.19 arid 4.20.

•i.

'·

'
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//Subprogram· .. : put_combined_message
//pu:rpose
: sends the valid char. together with ilS
: swrounding misinformation characle!S
II
: out of the serial port 1/0 link
II
//return
: none
//parameters
: the_valid_message: poinlS to start ofvalid message.·· ..
: none
//side-effects
II .
void put_combined_message( char •tbe_valid_messagc)
{int this_hopping_pattem = 0,
CWTent_char,
the_length = strlen(the_valid_message)~
· I/for (each character in the valid message) loop
for ( current_char-=0; current_char < the_length; current_char++j ···
{ int lhis_channel;
!(zero_channels_already_used
.
.
. . .
memset(channels_already_lised, 0, MAX_CH~L~l);.

':

IIfor (each channel) loop
. .
. .
. . . .
for (lhis_channel=O; this_channel < MAX_CHANNEL; this_chann.el++t
· { byte original_char;
·
1/if(this_channel = this J,opping pattern) then
if (lhis_channel == hopping_pattern[this_hopping_pattem])
. { /Igel next character from "11alid message
original_char = the_valid_message[current_chart

L

~il

}

else
{ //gd next chara'cter from randomly selected misinformation string
original_char = get_next_misinfo_char( );

}//if
1/transmil resultant character;
put( re_arrange_bits_of( original_char));
· }//for

.!/advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion
_if(·H-this..:.hopping_pattem >= MAX_PATIERN) ·
lhis_hopping_pattem = O;
}//for
}

Figure 4.19.

The C function, "put:_combined_message", suitably modift~d to
re-arrange the transmitted data's bit order.
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.· //Subprogram
: re_arrange_bits_of
: re-arranges the bits of original_char
I/purpose
//return
.
: the re-arranged char
: char original_char: the char to be re-arranged
//parameters
: none
I/side-effects
II
I/get the bit patterns
#include "bit_patt.h"
l/111 least significant (first char)
/Ito most significant biJ(last char) order
byte bit_equivalents[]={ l,2,4,8,16,32,64,128};
byte re_arrange_bits_.if( byte originaJ_char)
{byte re_arranged_cbar = 0,
current_bit~
static char current_pattem = O;
I/for (each biJ in the char) loop
for{ current_bit = 0~ current_bit < 8; current_bit++)
{ Iii/( current_biJ is set) then...
if( original_char & bit_cquivalents(current_bit])
{ I/set ils substituted bit in the re-arranged char.
re_arranged_char 1= pattems[current_pattcm];

}!!if
I/advance this shuffle pattern
current_pattem+= I;
}//for
//placing bounds on the cycle of shuffle pattern
/Ito keep the advance in cyclicftuhion
if( currcnt_pattcm >=TOTAL_PATTERNS)
{ currcnt_pattem = O;
}//if
}

return re_ananged_char;
.

., Figure 4.20.

The C subprogram re_a"ange_bits_of, which acts upon the
passed-in parameter original_char.

AJI data, before being transmitted, is subjected to the code contained in subprogram .

re_arrange_bits_of( ), to which is passed the parameter of original_char. It may be
seen that this subprogram relies upon two pre-defined data items: namely, one array of
bytes called hit_equivalents[J, and another array of bytes called patterns[J.
Respectively, these are depicted in Figures 4.20 and 4.21 and contain in ascending
order (i.e., least significant bit first) images of the bits of each character, and images of
72

the bit replacements according to a randomly generated pattern. !_he. atray, patterns[];
is· created prior to compilation of the implementation code, the reasons for which are
now explained.
In order that the re-arranging of bits within each byte does not become an excessively
costly affair in tenns of CPU resources and, that sender and legitimate receiver may
both know the order of bit re-arrangement, the patterns of replacement bits are
contained in the C include file "bit_patt.h". This file is necessarily included during
compilation of the implementation code. Such a mechanism permits two economies
over that of generating the pattern "on-the-fly":
•

it provides the rapid access mechanism provided by the use of "look-up" tables; ·

and
• · ·it permits the storage of the tables in program ROM, rather than. the. scarce RAM ·
available for the CPU;s operations.

byte patterns[] = {
4,64,1,32,8, 128, 16,2,
128,2,64,32, 16,8,l,4,
l, 16, 128,64,8,4,2,32,
128,4,32,64,8,2, 16, 1.
1,4,64,8,16, 128,2,32,
8,1,4,2,128,32,64, 16,
64, 128,4, 1,8, 16,32,2,0};

#defme TOTAL_PA'ITERNS 56

Figure 4.21 ..

The contents of ''bit_patt.h", being the table of substitute bits
used to re_arrange a byte prior to transmission. For clarity,
these have been formatted in 'groups of eight.

The implementation code used to generate the pattern in Figure 4.21 is illustrated in ·
Figure 4.22.
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-//Program
//Pwpose

:Bit_Sel.C
:Outputs bit patterns which for inclusion for bit-rearrangement by smart- ·
:card communications emulation program
//0/S required :MS-DOS I Windows DOS box:/ Unix
:Exits with 1 upon error; else Nonnal termination
//Returns
//Pwpose
:Creates a table of bit replacement values of eight times the pattern . . .
:repetition rate. Also defines tbe amount of TOTAL_PA'ITERNS for
:in a C program
· //Parameters
:The number of patterns required, via the program command line.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

use ·.

void print_usageQ//explains to user how to use the program
{printf("\nUsage = bit_sel.ex:e n > filenamev\n\n");
printf(" Where n = number of patterns required\n\n");
printf("\nFor example: bit_sel 7 > bit_Jlatt.h\n11 );
exit(});
}

void main(int argc, char •argvlJ)
{ int outer, inner, bit, pattern_size = O;

if (argc > 1)
.
. . .
. . ·. ·
.
. ·
{ if( (argv{l][O] > 'O') && (argvJI)[O] <;,, '9')) pattem_size = argv[l][O]'~ '01;
else { print_usageQ; }//if ·
·
·
·
· ·
printf("\nbyte patterns[] = {");
for(outer = O; outer< pattem_size; ciuter++)
{ int used[8] = {-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1};
'

'

'

. ...

.,

'

.,

t

.

for( inner= O; illller < 8; inner++)
{intok= O;
· while {!ok)
{ int test;
ok = 1; bit= randO % 8;
//has this bit image been used before?
· for( t~st = O; test< 8; test++)
{ ii( used[test] == bit) { ok = O; break; }//if
}//for

~_'; ..

if(ok)
{ used[inner] = bit;//mark as being used
printf("o/od, ", OxO 1 :<< bit );
}//if

}//while
}//for
}//for
printf("O};\n#defi.ne
TOTAL_PATI'ERNS o/Qli", (pattem_size • 8));
}
.

.

.

.

_e]se
{ print_usage();
}//if
}
·.

Figure 4.22. Program code to produce the include file "bit_patt h ". ·
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· The· program whose source code is detailed in Figure 4.22 may be executed from an
operating system command line, accepting a single command line parameter of the
length of the bit re-arrangement pattern. The program's output may be re-directed to
be contained in a disk file.

Where no parameter accompanies the program's

invocation, a simple message containing suggested program ::,1age is displayed for the
user's benefit.

4.2.3.2 Test data and resultant productions.

Two sets of data are presented in Figures 4.23 and 4.24: one showing the results of
valid textual data, surrounded by textual misinformation and then transmitted with each
byte's bit order re-arranged; and the other showing valid data which is numerical in
nature, surrounded by the same textual misinformation. As the transmitted characters.
are now binary in nature, many are unprintable. For clarity of presentation, the output
has been formatted into hexadecimal pairs, each pair being bracketed thus [ ].
The pattern is: 232533 5611003
The me/lsage is: The sun was shining on the sea
The output is:
[30J[81] [SA] [3 8] [4F] (48J [AO J[DD] fC9 J[D6 J(52 J[CE] (6CJ [BS J[91 J(DB] {87] [B2] [80Jf64 JI70J
[DC) [08] f07] (3 A J(80] {20 J(15 J[80J[08] I46 J[9E] (CF] [EI] [70] f95 J[89] [SE] [BA] [86] [ 6F] [FS]
[DC][ IB]I04 ]I02 J[SFJf 67] [FCI[99] [EB JI471[02] [D2]I 6AJ[ 101(84] (DB] [04 J[ 52]fCA]I67Jf3 I]
[B 1] [89] ISEJ f02 J[80 J[6CJ [71 J[DC] [09] [04 J(9EJ (80 If62] (71 J[80 J[EB J(9 7 J[54J[4F] l 20J[B4 J
(90)[08] (07] [9EJ [06 J[65] [BS J(B4 J[C9J [46 J(92} [CF] j 20] [BOJ [DC) [OBJ [IE J[02 I( CE) [E9] [ l 5J
[BOJ[69] [D6J[32l[C3 ][EO]l l0][801(08] [ IE] (92][02J(6A]l70 J[DDJIA91[8E]l76][D7][66]13C]
[BO) [6B J[ 46J[B6] [CF] f20] [F5 J(84] [EB] [04] j 96J[97J [20] (7 4] [DD J[D9J f04] [3 A] (80] [6B] [FS]
[Al] [6B] [D7] [B6] [SAJ[48] [FS] [BO J[08 J[C6 J(76 J[80] [El J(7 4] [99] [491(86) (02] (SB] [6E) [JC]
[BOJI08](4Fl[02 J[OEJ[E4J[ IO] [99]129] (07J[B2Ji80JI 6A]l3 l ]195I[9B]I04 J[76](86J[EA](3I J
[80](OB](041[9E1(80] [EI] [F5 ){99 ]168J[87J [B2 J[8A ][E9 1 ~S 1(84 ][ 59][07]{ IE]{CF] [68]f7C]

Figure 4.23.

Textual valid data, envdoped within textual misinformation and
subjected to the bit re-arrangement algorithm.
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The pattern is: 2325335611003

The message is: 0610892461879
The output is:
[30]f8l](OC](38)(4F][48J[AO][DDJ(C9J[D6](2E][CE][6C][B5]{9l][DBJ(OD][B2]I80)(64]l70][DCJ
[08](07][3AJ[80][AO][l5][80][08](46][4A][CFJ[EIJ[70J[95)(89](8EJ[CA](86](6FJ[F8J[DC][IB)[04]
[02] [SFJ[A I J[FC} (99] [EBJ [47] [02 J[D2] [6A] (1CJ [84J[5A] (04] [52] [CAJ(67] [31 ][Bl] (98] [SE) (02] [80]
(6C] [71 JIAS] [D9] [04] (9E] [80] (62 J[71 J[CD] (EBJ [97] [54] (4F] [20] [84] (9DJ f08] [07] [CA] [06) [65) [85]

Figure 4.24.

Numeric valid data, enveloped within textual misinformation
and subjected to the bit re-arrangement algorithm.

Observation of the two productions shows that the numeric valid data blends into the
·surrounding cocoon of misinformation in similar fashion to the textual valid data.

4.2.3.3 Timing Data
Observations for timing of application of the scrambled method, for various message
lengths are recorded in Figure 4.25. The times were measured using a hopping pattern
of length thirteen, time division multiplexed across seven logical channels, within the
bandwidth provided by one physical channel at a bit rate of ninety-six hundred bits per.
second (b.p.s.). Each character's transmission is performed according to a protocol of
eight data bits, one stop bit and an even parity bit and, including the time necessary for
setting up the simulated smart~card's I/0 link, consumed t .35ms.

Valid Message Method Setup
Length
. Time (ms)
(characters)
1
24
8
24
16
24
24
24
Figure 4.25.

Process only of
Transmitter
(ms)
6.6
59
103
163

Process only of Process+
Receiver (ms)
Transmission
{ms)
0.52
17
4,1
139
262
8
12
402

Timing data obsenred for the basic method, augmented by the
random changing of the bit order or transmitted characte.n of'
the transmitted text.

Note that the transmission time includes the transfer of the number of valid characters
times the number of channels.
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4.3 Discussion
The three scenarios developed in the previous chapter have each been presented in
terms of implementation, respective production of appropriate test data, and CPU
resource requirements. The latter has been presented in terms of time and, as the
smart-card CPU is a single-tasking non-interrupt-driven-device, with a known clock
frequency, the time taken to perform a task is entirely representative of that task's
CPU resource requirements.

The timing measurements have been separated into three components for each of the
scenarios implementations: namely,
•

the set-up processing, or pre-amble, for the session of conversation between the
transmitter and receiver;

•

the in-transmission processing time; and

•

the transmission time.

The processing performed during the pre-amble, i.e., generation of the hopping pattern
and set up of the misinformation look-up database, may be considered to be a one-off
expense per session. Conveniently, and as stated earlier, this may be accomplished,
together with the secret communication of the hopping pattern between the
communicating parties, when a card holder is accustomed to delays in the norma' ·•·
initialisation sequence of a transaction. In consequence, this processing delay may be
judged to cause no discernible inconvenience to the card holder.

The in-transmission processing time may be seen to have some impact upon the rate at
which the transmitter issues each character. However, the delay has been minimised by
. making better use of CPU time to generate the next-needed p:]eudo-random number.
A shift register algorithm, using an appropriate polynomia1, for this has been selected
so that the PRNG processing is divided across the CPU's idle-time while transmitting a
character's individual data, parity and stop bits.

The transmission time expenditure, for each of the three techniques has been
demonstrated, using time division multiplexing of several logical channels mapped onto
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one physical channel. As expected, such mapping deteriorates the useful bit rate of
that channel, representing the worstMcase situation for the channel•hopping mechanism
under development. The provision of additional physical channels will proportionately
improve the overall data throughput of the implementation.
In summary, it may be stated that as much as possible of the processing required by the .'
·techniques is shifted to the pre-amble phase, so that the in-cycle processing overhead :
may then be held at an absolute minimum. The transmitter accomplishes much of the
work, while the receiver's task is limited to that of collecting the vaJid cha~cters from
the appropriate channel.
Whilst it is accepted that encryption such as that using.the Data Encryption Staricl.ard .
. (DES) algorithm offers much higher levels of security, it also requires notably more
processing resources. The DES implementation code given in Seberry et al. (1989, pp .. ·
.

"

.

321-336) was compiled and run using the same target system with the following
results:
· • . method setup time: 474ms;
•

each DES word length (8 bytes) encrypted: 428ms; and ·

•

each DES word length (8 bytes) decrypted: 428ms .

. Using this DES implementation would require therefore, in addition to the method set.
up, 856ms of processing time for each set of eight bytes of the valid message, plus
11 ms transmission time.
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4.4 · Evidence found that supports the Research Question
The main question, restated from chapter two, is:-

.· "Can the mechanism of channel-hopping be adapted to enhance the security of date,
transmitted between an IS0-78/6 compliant contact-based smart-card and its
read/write machine with minimal cost to CPU resources, hardware and software?"

Channel~hopping, when usecl in its conventional applications, relies upon a system's
ability to intersperse, in random fashion, the valid data across severe.I channels of lesser
bandwidth within the system's overall bandwidth. Recall, from chapter two, Torrieri's

(1994, p. 199) description of the fundamental concepts of channel-hopping using
carrier frequencies:
"Frequency-hopping 1s the periodic changing of the frequency or
frequency set associated with a transmission. A frequency-hopping signal
may be regarded as a sequence of modulated pulses with pseudorandom ·
.carrier frequencies. The set of possible carrier frequencies is called the
hopset. · Hopping occurs over a frequency band that includes a number of
frequency channels."

The ISO 7816 standard mandates that two smart-C¥d contacts are available to provide
physical channels for I/0 to/from the card reader. The standard further suggests that
one channel be used for serial I/0, but provides for usage of the second channel in a
less regulated manner.

The study demonstrates the mapping of several logical channels (the hopset) onto the
smart-card serial 1/0 link's available physical channels.

Further, the studfs

· implementation has mapped all logical channels onto one physical link. The valid data
is transmitted, pseudo~randomly, on one of the logical channels within the
communications link's available bandwidth.

To protect the valid data's current

channel, suitably chosen misinformation data is co~transmitted on the other channels
within the hopset.
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The. ·end. result

is that the valid data may be transmitted~ within· an envelope of

·. ···protective misinformation data. The protection afforded by this obfuscated package of
transmitted data increases the complexity of an eavesdropper's task, enhancing.· t:he
·.security of the transmitted data.

.,/

.. -·.·· ...'
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4.5 Summary

The target hardware system is selected to be representative of the type of MCU
featured in contemporary smart-cards in widespread use, and to allow demonstration
of the techniques developed by this project. The language used for implementation of
those techniques, C, permits the ready adaptation of algorithmic pseudo-code to
compilable source code. Furthermore, C is rapidly becoming the "language of choice"
for embedded system3 development, as found by Vereen (1996, pl9), as a result of
both better standards and improved commercially available compilers. The use of C
increases the portability of the implementation to other MCU targets.

The example implementations are carefully structured to:
•

demonstrate the techniques in response to the need •of each .of the scenarios . ·
identified in chapter three; and

·• .demonstrate appropriate output using signific.ant ex~mples of valid data.
='<':.• ~.

.

.

Suitable annotated extracts from the implementations are provided, together with their
productions of the randomly shuffled transmitted text. The components of resource
utilisation involved in transmitting the valid text, cocooned within its protective
rnisinfonnation, are discussed.

Although, the study's techniques and that of DES sit at opposite ends of the spectrum
of security for transmitted data, the execution of the DES algorithm ( compiled using
published source code) was observed to take approximately twenty times longer to setup, and approximately six times longer for the encoding and decoding of each eight-'
byte packet of data.

Finally, based upon the demonstration incorporated in the productions of the test data,·
'

'

answers in the affirmative are provided to t~e research question as stated in chapter .

two.
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5. Conclusion

To introduce tltis final chapter, let us first examine the raison d'etre for this study, then_
retrace the study' s progress. The initial task was to perfonn an examination of the
· serial I/0 link between a smart-card and its associated read-write machine.

This

- examination revealed the ease with which the link could be monitored, without
detection, and its data captured and removed for later examination. At the outset, the
field of smart-cards was, and still is, relatively unknown in the Australian community.
_From publications, as referenced above, it was known that Australian law provides
little protection for the privacy of data regarding the individual.

Examination of

contemporary usage of smart-cards in other countries indicated that privacy of a card- holder's data does not always appear to be of primary concern for the card-issuers.
Perceiving that smart-cards will, inevitably, become commonplace in Australia., a
- decision was made to extend the scope of the study to explore mechanisms whereby _
plaintext transmitted on the smart-card communications link could be shielded from a
potential observer.

Chapter one elaborates on the above concerns, gives the

uninfonned reader an explanation of the evolution of smart-cards, and presents a.
formal introduction to the study and its intended form.

· In formalising the problem during chapter two, the general issues _of_ cq_ncealing
- transmitted data are introduc~d. Security issues are noted, relating-fri\he fo~damentai
threats which may be enabled by leakage of infonnation from such as an insecure __
communications link. The notion of adapting the concepts and techniques of channelhopping, now in a state of maturity in the fields of military radar and communications,
to the resource-poor smart-card MCU, is explored and a justification established for an
adaptation of channel-hopping, known as the Randomised-Shuffle technique, to be
pursued.

Techniques of surrounding the shuffled valid text with appropriate

Misinfonnation are developed and justified, so that they may be applied to frustrate
further the task of an eavesdropper.

_____.

_____________________________

I.

__.

Chapter three describes the development of scenarios whereby the Randomised Shuffle
. and Misinformation may be applied to protect the valid text. These scenarios are
employed to form a framework with which to gauge the worth of the emergent ideas.
The applicability of the co-transmitted misinformation is discussed, a design for the
basic method is established, and an algoritlun is provided for the fundamental
techniques of channel-hopping and application of misinfonnation. In consequence of
the very limited nature of the smart-card,s memory, methods are developed whereby
specific misinformation text may be re-used and disguised to reduce the repeatability of
its appearance when transmitted with the valid data. Those enhancements deemed to
be achievable within the smart-card MCU, s limited feature-set, together with their
respective algorithms, are added to the scenarios with which the implementation is
concerned.

Factors impacting on the choice of target system and software tools are discussed, in
chapter four, prior to a presentation of the design and eventual implementation of each
. of the scenarios. Three scenarios are provided with implementations: namely,
· ·•

the basic method1 whereby valid data is interspersed within a cocoon of supplied
misinfonnation text;

•

the substitution method, whereby applicable consonants within the misinfonnation
text are substituted in an endeavour to diminish repeatability of the transmitted
data~ and

·•

the scrambled method, whereby a further hopping pattern is applied to each bit of
every transmitted character, thus reducing repeatability.

The productions issuing from each of the implementations are captured and displayed, ·
together with timing data for various message lengths. The impact of the three phases
of the mechanisms upon CPU resources are discussed in context of the amount of
physical channels available. The implementation of enhancements to improve overall
efficiency, such as taking advantage of non-productive timing loops to perform
pseudo-random number generation, are demonstrated.

Finally, the much greater

processing resources required to execute the DES algorithm on the same hardware is
determined.
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The Randomised Shuffle and Applied Misinformation mechanisms which are achieved
represent an extension of the proven technology of channel-hopping, applied to the
new target of a character~based serial communications link. The techniques and their
implementations incorporate the following features:
•

each session generates and relies upon a one-time key, in order that large quantities
of repeatable protected text may not be gathered for analysis;

•

the co-transmitted misinformation may be aligned for similarity with the valid data,
so that where the enveloped transmitted text is deciphered, the eavesdropper must
still select from several plausible choices;

• ·. the majority of the processing is accomplished at a convenient time before
transmission, so that where sufficient physical links are available for mapping of the
logical links, the activities of neither transmitter nor legitimate receiver are
substantially increased;
•

repeatability within the transmitted text is further diminished by application of the
substitution or scrambled enhancements;
:

:

•

most data elements used by the implementation reside either in ROM or ~he. system
stack, so as to minimise the intrusion intothe data space available for other· .
applications in the target;

.•

the techniques have been implemented in .C, thereby increasing· portability to other
target MCUs.

Implications for future research include the addition of suitable hardware to enable
random numbers to be derived from natural sources (e.;; . amplified noise from within
an on-chip resistor), the development of efficient natural language generation elements ·

to produce misinformation appropriate to the type of valid text, and the technique's
adaptation to situations where multiple processors need to communicate secretly, using
multiple physical channels. One possible example of the last case is where multiple
MCUs are embedded into a single smart-card to increase the card's overall processing
P.ower. Then, the studfs techniques could serve to obfuscate the electro-magneti~
radiation available to an eavesdropper from inter-MCU communications.
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Other .·

·examples · include -·the camouflage of data across both cable-bound ·and wireless
networks, where the available bandwidth is less limited.

.·,/

L - - - - - - - - - - - ' -_ _s_s_____________.l

6. Appendix A: Glossary of terms
68HC05/

An eight-bit microcontroller manufactur~d by Motorola. ·

MC68HC05
8051

An eight-bit microcontroller manufactured by Inter and other
manufacturers e.g., Phillips and Siemens.

Attack

An actual realisation of a threat.

b.p.s.

Bits Per Second.

A measure of the rate · of transmission of a

communications link.
Carrier frequency

The centre frequency of a modulated transmission.

,.ii

;;

·.,}.:

Channel-hopping

The periodic changing of the channel assopiated with a
i!/

communications link or conversation.

.,

.if

Cipher

"The method, technique or algorithm used to rend!~r the plain-text
.

;;

':[

unintelligible." (Longley, Dawson & Caelli, 1994).

\;

.

i!.

•I

Cipher-text

"

The result of the application of the cipher to the plain-text,
ie the
\\
·.

unintelligible or scrambled form of the message (Lohgley, Dawson
.

·.

'.l

.

;i,

& Caelli, 1994).

(:

,..

·::,.

F

Comment (in C Comments may be entered in C code;··, in two forms:. ejther prefixed
!I

code)·

.

.

·1!

by two slashes (i.e., //) where the corrifnent does not exbeed a single
'·.'·.

line; and prefixed and suffixed with

a..,.
'

'

,.

• f'

\',

pai:r where the

comment extends further than one line.
.'i.

CPU

Central Processing Unit, being the part of a computer where logical
and arithmetic instructions are performed and address and
instruction decoding takes place.

Cryptanalysis

The methods used to break a cipher system and/ or forge coded
signals so that they will be accepted as authentic (Longley, Dawson
& Caelli, 1994),

86

Cryptographic

Some additional secret information used in conjunction with the

key

cipher algorithm to perform the cryptographic process (Longley,
Dawson & Caelli, 1994).

Cryptography

The methods used to ensure the secrecy and/or authenticity of
messages (Longley, Dawson & Caelli, 1994).

Cryptology

The science and art of secret communications (Longley, Dawson &
Caelli, 1994).

DEA/DES

An algorithm for encrypting/decrypting 64 bits of data using a 56 bit

(plus 8 parity bits) key. Although originally intended for u~.e in
protecting unclassified but sensitive US Government information,
the algorithm is now widely used in commercial applications
(abridged from Jackson & Hruska, 1992).
Decryption/

The process of converting the unintelligible message (the cipher-

Decipherment

text) back to its intelligible form (the plain-text) (Longley, Dawson
& Caelli, 1994).

EM/RF

Information is extracted from Radio Frequency or Electro-Magnetic

interception

emanations from electrical/electronic equipment.

Encryption/

The process of convertir.g the intelligible message (the plain-text) to

Encipherment

an unintelligible form (the cipher-text) (Longley, Dawson & Caelli,
1994).

Frequency

Number of repetitions in a given time, typically measured in Hertz or
cycles per second.

Frequency-

The periodic changing of the carrier frequency associated with a

hopping

transmission channel.

Full-duplex

Describes a communications link where data may travel in both
directions at once.

HS

An eight-bit microcontroUer manufactured by Hitachi.

Half-duplex

Describes a communications link where data may. travel in either
direction, but not simultaneously.
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Integrated

An electronic device containing logic gates or signal processing

Circuit/ IC/ Chip

circuitry, all contained in one plastic packag~.

Jamming

Is achieved by transmitting electromagnetic energy to influence the
field strength of another's communications transmissions.
SmaJI syntactic units forming the lowest level units of a given

Lexeme

language.
Logical

Access The use of procedures related to control of access to information

Control

and knowledge rather than physical security (summarised from
Longley & Shain, 1988, p. 202).

MC68HC11

An eight-bit microcontroller manufactured by Motorola.

MCU

Micro Controller Unit. An alias for microcontroller.

MCUs, in

general, contain' all of the essential features that comprise a selfcontained microcomputer.

These are: CPU, Memory (RAM &

ROM), control signal circuitry, oscillator circuitry, reset signal
conditioning, and Input/Output circuitry.
Multiplexer

A

switching

mechanism

which

manages

the

sharing

of

communications channels by conversations. In Frequency Division
Multiplexing (FDM), the available frequency spectrum is divided
among discrete logical channels with each carrying a conversation,
whilst in Time Division Multiplexing (TOM) each conversation
carrying channel takes its tum, in accessing a shared physical link(s),
in Round-Robin, interleaved style.
protocol control information governing the communication between

PCI

entities.

Phone~e

A unit of significant sound in a given language. Phonemes are
constructed from phones, each of which is a simple vowel or
consonant sound.

PIN

Personal Identification Number.
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Plain-text

The original, understandable message (Longley, Dawson & Caelli,
1994).

Risk

A measure of cost of a realised vulnerability that incorporates the

probability of a successful attack.
RSA

A pubHc key cryptosystem scheme, devised and described by Rivest,

Shamir & Adleman (1978).
Safeguanl

Controls or mechanisms to protect assets from threats.

Secure channel

A pathway between the sender and the receiver of a message that -

may be guaranteed to be safe, ie. free from any iJlicit observation or
modification of messages canied on it by any third party (Longley,
Dawson & Caelli, 1994).
Security:
a Deflnition _

"A system is secure if it adequately protects information that it

processes

against

unauthorised

unauthorised

disclosure,

modification, and unauthorised withholding: .. We say adequately
because no practical system can achieve these goals without
qualification; security is inherently relative." (Landwehr, Heitmeyer
& Mclean, 1984).
SVC

Stored Value Cards

Swipe Card

"A plastic card with a narrow magnetic stripe that may be employed
..

for access control or authority to initiate a transaction" (Longley
and Shain, 1989, p. 206).
TDM

Time Division Multiplexing: see Multiplexer.

Threat

A person, thing, event or idea which poses some danger to _an asset·
in terms of that asset's confider1tiality, integrity or availability for
legitimate use.

Visa

A global credit and banking organisation.

Vulnerability

Weakness or absence ofa safeguard. ··
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7. Appendix Bl: Source Code Listing:- C code.
//Program Name
II
//Author

: SHUFFLE.C

: Michael Collins

II
//Purpose

JI
II

: ImplelT!.ents Randomised Shuffle & Misinfonnation Techniques
: as developed for M.Sc. Thesis. Completed July 1997

: 27 July 1997
//Last Update
II
//Reason: General Documentation
II

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string. h>
#include <ctype.h>
#define byte unsigned char
//Memory mapped 1/0 to assist in timing measurements
//Port A data register
unsigned char PORT_A @ OxlOOO;
//Port A control registerunsigned char PORT_A_CONTROL @Oxl026;
#define INDICATOR_BIT Oxfb
#define SETUP_INDICATOR (PORT_A_CONIROL l"" Oxff)
#define SET_lNDICATOR (PORT_A i"" INDICATOR_BIT)
#define RESET_INDICATOR (PORT_A &= -INDICATOR_BIT)
//if this is defined, includes program sections for
//displaying introduction messages
1/#define PRINT_INfRODUCTION 1
#define new_ line "\xd\xa 11
//comment out all but one or the next group
#define RANDOM_SHUFFLE_MODE I
//#define
RANDOM_SHUFFLE_NUMERIC_DATA_MODE 1
//#define
SWAP_CONSONANTS_MODE 1
//#define
BIT _SHUFFLE_MODE l

t•ourvalid message*/
char •message =
. _ _
"The sun was shining on the sea, shining with all his might: he did his very best to make the billows
smooth and bright and this was odd, because it was the middle of the night. 11 ; .
·
!•the textual Misinformation in which the valid text is hidden•/
char •misinfo I "' 11Twas brillig and the slithy tovcs did gyre and gimble in lhe wabe: ·Al] mimsy were
the borogoves and the mome raths outgrabc "~
char •misinfo2 = "Beware the Jabberwock, my son! Tile jaws that bite, the claws that catch! Beware
the Jubjob bird, and shun The frumious Bandersnatchf ";
char •misinfoJ = "He took his vorpal sword in hand: Long time the manxome foe he sought, so rested
by the Tumtum tree, And stood awhile in thought. 11 ;
·
·
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char •misinfo4 = And as in offish thought he etood, The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame came
whiffing through the tulgey wood, and brubled as it camel 1';
char •misiruo5 "' "One, two! One, two! And through and through, the vorpal blade went snicker
snack! He left it dead, and with its head, he went galumping back 11 ;
char •misiruo6 == 11 And hast thou slain the Jabbetwock? Come to my anns, my beamish boy! 0
frabjous day! Calloohl Callay! He chonled in his joy. \
·
11

/•these consonants are easily swapped*/
·.. char •interchangeable_consonants = "bcdfghjklnmprstvz11 ~
static byte consonants_length;
//the multiplexed channel details

#define MAX_CHANNEL 7
char •nusinfo_channels[MAX_CHANNELHl]; /• pointers to misinfo string~ •J
byte misinfo_Ien(MAX_CHANNEL~I];/*pre-calculated strlen of each misinfo s~/
byte misinfo_pos[MAX_CHANNEL-1]; /*holding the current position of next char
to be accessed in this string•/
//hopping pattern details
Hdefin~ MAX_PATIERN 13
byte hopping_pattern{MAX_PAITERN];

:.. __'

,.........................
function prototypes

*·························,
· //these
are contained in async assembler interface moduie
· ·
//for transmission of chars.
extern scasynchvmte( byte the_char);
extern scasynchinit(void);
//interface to shift-register random number ganerator
extern myrand_init(void);
extern void myrand(void);
extern int ncxt_rand;
//reference the assembler code to put characters
// n.b. x (a byte) is passed in ACC B register
#define put(x) (scasynchwrite(x))
/•function prototypes contained in Uiis module•/
byte get_next_misinfo_char(void);
void init_pattcms(void);
void put_hex( byte the_byte);
void put_string(cl,ar *U1e_message);
void put_combined_message( char •the_valid_message)~
#ifdef BIT_SHUFFLE_MODE
byte re_arrange_bils_of( byte original_char);
#endif
char next_char_from(int misinfo_selected);
#ifdef SWAP_CONSONANTS_MODE
char swap_consonant(char the_char);
#endif;
/•these replace some <ctype.h> functions
reducing the size of compiled code•/
#define LOWER_BOTIOM (Ox60)

//('a' - 1)
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#define LOWER_TOP (Ox7b) //('z' + 1)
#define UPPER_BO'ITOM (Ox40) //('A' - 1)
#define UPPER_TOP (Ox5b)
//('Z' + 1)
#define is_upper(x) ((x > UPPER_BOITOM} &.& (x < UPPER_TOP)) •.
#define is_lower(x) ((x > LOWER_BOTTOM) && (x < LOWER_TOP))

,••...•.....•....••
enuy to C program

. .. - ·:r

,

••...•....••..•....

void mainO
{

//initialise serial port
scasynchinitO;
//initialise shift_register PRNG.
myrand_initO;
myrandQ;
SETUP_INDICATOR;
!•initialise misinfo into easily addressable matrix•i · ·
misinfo_channels[O]"' misinfol;
·
·
misinfo_channels[l] = misinfo2;
misinfo_channels[2) = misinfo3;
misinfo_channeislJ} = misinfo4;
misinfo_channels( 4] "" misinfo5~
misinfo_channels[5} = misinfo6;

,J

#if( PRINT_INTRODUCTION )
put_string("The pattern is: ");
#endif
//set up hopping patterns
init.J)attemsQ;
#if( PRINT_IN1RODUCTION)
put_string{ new_line);
put_slring("The message is: 11);
put_string( message); put_string( new_line);
put_string("The output is:");
#endif

SET_INDICATOR;
put_combined_message{ message);
RESET_INDICATOR;

. . . !.

.

;_

'(

#if{ PRINT_IN1RODUCTION).
put_string( new_line);
#endif

while(l)
;/* loop forever, effectively halting program•/
}/•main•/
·;:L

"-·-----------------//Sub-Program :init.J)attems
//purpose
II

:initialises pseudo-random pattern for channel
:hopping to utilise.
·

//return

:void

f_
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:none
·
.
:Global .Variables: patteniO; misinfo_posD; ·

//parameters

oi/side-effects

)I

···

. void init_pattemsO
{.

... :; . .
..

·:;) .

·,,
.·.

byte ij;·

(~.
:.. :.. ··_.·

.-~-·-.

. for (i=O; f < (MAX_CHANNEL-1); i++}
. { nusinfo_posf i] "" O;
misinfo_len[i] = strlen(misinfo_channels(i]);
}

. ·.o

.

consonants_length =strlen(interchangeable_consonants); .

t) ·:~ .· ..

/•initiaJise pattern of transmission•/
for(i=O; i <MAX_PATI'ERN; i++)
{ j = i'andQ % MAX_C9ANNEL;
hopping_pattern[i) = j;
· #if( PRINT_INI'RODUCTION)

· put(j+'0 1);
#endif

.. ''.'(:,

.

.....

}//if

.r·:.-.

-----------------: put_hex

II
j /SubMPro gram
llpwpose

: for testing/debugging:
: enables program to output,
: via the serial port 1/0 link,
: formatted bytes in hex (base 16);
: enclosed within[] braces.
: none
: lhe_char to be transmitted
: none

II . ..

/I

II
II·
1/retlim

}/parameters
·11side.;effects
II

i.t
·-=·

.i

.. void.put_hex{ byte lhc_byte)
·{..

..

.

.. byte i, temp; .
P.Ut( 1( 1);

.

·.

.

.

'

ror(i == o; i < 2; i++)

{lf{ i ~;,;, 0) . . .
. temp= (the_byte & OxID) lOxlQ;//upper nybble ·

\cl~

.

.

. :: ._..... :
. "~ ·. ':·

..

.<te.!DP =:= (lhe_byte & OxOf);//low~r.nybble.
'-. ..

-

.. ·=.

.

.if{temp < 10) ·
. plit(temp + '01);//offset to make into [0.,9) . •
else
. . . .
. ; · . · ..
. put(temp + S5); //offs~t to make into (A .• F} .
}//for

.. p~i( ']'); .

~___,I·

· . I._·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._93_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

}

II
_ //Sub-Program -- : jJUt_string
· , //pwpose
: for testing/debugging
__
_
··II
: sends a null terminated C-string to the seriBl
//
: port uo link
II
//return
: none
: the message to be sent
//parameters
//side-effects
: none
II
void put_slring{cbar •lhe_message)
{

while( •the_message) /•onl}' put characters which are not null(terminator)*/
{ puWthe_message);
·
the_message++; /•move on to the next character•/
}

'

}

byte channels_already_used[MAX_CHANNEL-1];
ll
.
. //Sub-Program
//purpose
·l/
//return
//parameters
//side-effects
II_
II
II
ll
II_

: get_next_misinfo_char
: gets next character from randomly selected
: misinformation string.
·
: the next misinformation char ( typed to byte)
: none
_ _
: The array 'channels_already_used[J' has the appropriate entry updated,
·
: signifying which
: misinfonnation strings have already been used
: during the current cycle of transmitting an
: enveloped valid character.

byte get.:_next_misinfo_char()
'

{

._

byte misinfo_selected = neirt_rand % (MAX_CHANNEL-i); ..
//make sure all channels have a chance:
//if the initial random selection has already been used ._
//lhen select the next one available
while( channels_already_uscd[misinfo_selected))
·
{ misinfo_selected += l;
if (misinfo_selected >= (MAX_CHANNEL~ 1)) ·
misinfo_selected"" O;
}//while
//mark this channel as having been used in this cycle
channels_already_used[misinfo_selected] = 1;
return (next_char_from( misinfo_selected));

__________________

//

//Sub~J>rogra.m
//purpose -

: put_combined_message
: sends the valid char, together with its
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II
II

//return
//parameters
//sic:!i:-effects
II .

: surrounding mis-information characters
: out of the serial port 1/0 link
: none
: the_valid_me.ssage: points to start of valid message
: none

void put_combined_message( char •the_valid_message)
{

byte this_hopping_pattem = 0,
current_char,
this_channel,
the_length "" slrlen(tbe_valid_message);
//for (each character in the valid message) loop
for ( current_char=O; currcnt_char < the_length; current_char++)
{

.

memset( channels_already_used, 0, MAX_CHANNEL-1)~
// for (each channel) loop...
for (lhis_channel=O; this_cha1U1el <MAX_CHANNEL; this_channel ++)
{

//if(this_channel = this hopping pattern) then...
if (this_channel ""= hopping_pattem[this_hopping_pattem])
{ //transmit next character from valid message
//compile this variation when running the basic scenario ·
#ifdefRANDOM_SHUFFLE_MODE
put(the_valid_message{current_charJ);
#endif
//compile this variation when running the swap-consonants mode
#ifdef SWAP_CONSONANTS_MODE
put(the_valid_message[ current_char]);
#endif
#ifdefBIT_SHUFFLE_MODE
put( re_arrange_bits_of( the_valid_message[current_char])); ·
// use next line to display output
//
put_hex( re_arrange_bit.i;_of( the_valid_message!currcnt_char]))~
#end.if
}

else
{ //transmit next character from randomly selected misinfonnation string
#ifdef'RANDOM_SHUFFLE_MODE
put( get_next_misinfo_char( ));
#endif
#ifdef SWAP_CONSONANTS_MODE
//iJ it is a consonant, randomly swap it with another consonant.
//Lransmit resu]tant character
put( swap_consonant(
get_ncxt_misinfo_char( )));
#endif
#ifdefBIT_SHUFFLE_MODE
put( re_arrange_bits_of( get_next_misinfo_charQ));
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II

put_hex( re_arrange_bils_of(get_next_ntisirifo_charQ));

-~~

.

. }//if
}//for

. //advance hopping pattern in a cyclic fashion
if(++this_hrippiog_pattem >= MAX_PATIERN) .
. · this_hopping_pattem = O;
·. ·.· }//for
}:
I/ . .
//Sub-Program . : next_char_from
. //purpose ·
: gels the next mis-information character to
. II .
.
: be transmitted, selected from the available
: misinfonnation strings
II
II
· //return
: next mis-infonnation character
: misinfo_selected (in mode): identifies the
. //parameters
: misinfonnation string from which the char
II
:·is to be taken
II .
: updates misinfo_posU, a record of the last
.I/side-effects
: char used from each misinfonnation string .
II
II
char next_chai-_from(int misinfo_selectcd)
.{·

char next_misinfo_char;
int index;
//relrieve position of the next available character's position from tllis channel
index= misinfo_pos[misinfo_selectedJ;
·
·
//obtain the character indexed by this position
next_misinfo_char = misinfo_channels[misinfo_sclectedJ[index]; ·
//record next available position for similar
index+=l~
//applying bounds so as not to index outside the misinfo string •
if (index>= misinfo_len[misinfo_selccted])
· ·
·· ·
{ index= O;
}//if

//record this updated index
niisinfo_pos[misinfo_seleclcd] = index;
return next_misinfo_char;
}

II ·
.. //Sub-Program
•. //purpose
II
. //return
II
//parameters

: re_armnge_bils_of
: re-arranges the bits oforiginal_char
: the re-arranged char
: char original_char: the char to be re-arranged
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//side-effects
: none
II
#ifdefBIT_SHUFFLE_MODE
//get the bit patterns
#include "bit_patt.h 11
//in least significant (first char)
//to most significant bit(last char) order
byte bit_equivalents[]={ l,2,4,8,16,32,64,128};
byte re_arrange_bits_of( byte original_char)
{

byte re_arranged_char = 0,
current_bit;
static char current_pattem = 0~
//for (each bit in the char) loop
for( current_bit = O; current_bit < 8; current_bit++)
{ //if( current_bit is set) lhen ...
if{ original_char & bit_equivaJents(current_bit])
{ //set its substituted bit in the re-arranged char

re_arranged_char I= patterns[current_pattern};
}//if
//advance this shuffle pattern
. current_pattem+=I;
}//for

//placing bounds on the cycle of shuffle pattern
//to keep the advance in cyclic fashion
if( current_pattem >= TOTAL_PATI'ERNS)
{ current_pattem = O;
}//if
return re_arranged_char;
}.

#endif

//SulrProgram . : swap_consonant
//purpose
: if the_char passed in is a (swappable)
ll
: consonant, randomly chooses a
: consonant wilh which it is swapped
If
//retum
: if able to swap the_char, returns
/l'
: the substitute consonant; else
fl
; returns the_char
//parameters
: lhe_char (in mode): a candidate character
II
: for swapping with another consonant
//side-effects
: none

If
#ifdef SWAP_ CONSONANTS_MODE
char swap_consonant(char lhe_char)
{

char temp = tolower( the_char),
+index = interchangeable_consonants;
while("'index)
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{·if( •index= temp)
•·{temp= interchangeable_consonants[next_rand % consonants_length]; i .·. ·.
· return (is_upper(the_char)? toupper(temp) : temp);
·
}
.

.

else ..
{
index++;
. }//if

}//while
return the_char;
}
#endif. · ·

(J-"·

I

9g·

I

8. . Appendix B2: Source Code: Assembly code for PRNG..
;thls code fragment demonstrates the bit-shift PRNG, optimised from Scheier's original C,;code for . •.··
use with the 68HC11 MPU.
· ·
parity_table
fcb 0, 128,128,0, I 28,0,0, 128, l 28,0, 0, 128,0, 128, 128,0
fcb 128,0,0,128,0, 128,128,0,0, 128, 128,0, 128,0,0, 128
fcb 128,0,0, 128,0, 128,128,0,0, 128, 128,0, 128,0,0, 128
fcb 0, 128, 128,0, 128,0,0, 128, 128,0,0,128,0, 128, 128,0
fcb 128,0,0,128,0, 128, 128,0,0,128, 12 8,0,128, 0,0, 128
fcb 0,128,128,0 ,128,0,0,128,128 ,0 ,0, 128,0, 128, 128,0
fcb 0, 128, 128,0, 128,0,0, l 28, 128,0,0, 128,0, 128, J 28,0
fcb 128,0,0, 128,0, 128, 128,0,0, 128, 128,0, 128,0,o, 128

... -

-

ldab r_sl
· · andb #%01010111
ldaa r_s4

bpi no_ hibit
.orab #o/oOOOOlOOO

;get lowest byte
;isolate lowest byte's polynomial bits
;get highest byte
; after this load the CCR (Flag register) has:
- N bit is complement of Ace A MSB
· - Z bit set if Ace A are all reset
;test the N bit in CCR
;set bit3 if highest byte msbit is set
this diminishes the size of parity
; look up table to 128 bytes c.f 256
; if we used lhe msbi t

no_hibit
;prepare to get the parity bit
;from the parity look-up table
~get table start
;add offset into parity-table

ldx #parity.:_tab1c
ab~ ·

;now the 4 byte shift for random seed update

· Ism ..

~first the highest byte
;or with parity of latest bit for insertion . ·
· ·
. . : . . .
· ;and save this
;rotate remainder in memory thru'_ carry flag

oraa 0,x

staa r_s4
•ror r_s3 ',
roi r_s2
ror r_sl'

before finally collecting next rand.om '
; bit lo be
·
returned fiom this iteration
;first into the low byte
· ;then on into the next higher byte·
;ditto
;into most significant byte
; note tl1at resl is aliased to next_rand in the C. program .

rol resl
rol res2
·: rol res3 .
rolres4 .

. ,·

.

.

.

.

·..··,.

99

-----------------1

I

9~.. Referen~e$.

.

.

r

· Computer Security Handbook. Blue Ridge

.· Baker, R._'(1991).

Summit, PA: TAB Professional and Reference
· Books (McGraw Hill).

Smart Cards in Australian Telecommunications

Bowcock, M. (1995).

·,·....

Towards 2000. Paper presented at the Australasian .

-;._

Smart Card Summit. 27-28 March 1995. Sydney
Australia
. Burton;. S~ Kalisk.i, ,Jr,. and

and .
Multiple Encryption: Weighing Security
. . .

. Robshaw, M. (1996}'.

Performance. Dr Dobbs Journal. Jan '96 pp. -123~

.-·.··

127. ·
· .· Caelli, W., Longley, D., and
.

.

.

.

.

Dawson, E. (1994).· ·. ·

Applications and Theory of Cryptography. In_·.

· Information Security Handbook. C~elli, Longley ·
and Shain. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press.,
1994, p 349

Cordonnier, V. (1995, June).

Seminar on Smart-cards given at Edith Cowan
University, Mount Lawley campus.

Dancer, H. (1995, May).

Visa trials cash on a card in Australia. Atistralian
Personal Computer.

De Schutter) B (1991).

Trends in the Fight Against Computer-Related ·
Delinquency. In Preneel, Govaerts·&- Vandewalle•
(Eds) Computer Security and Indusiri;l

Cryptography: State of the Art and Evolution.·
.

.

.

Dellecave, T.:<1995, June26th)

Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Red flag raised over standards. (Institute of
Electric and Electronics Engineers 802.11
interoperability standard) Information Week

Dinnissen, P. (1995, March).
,·

Secure Chip Cost Breakthrough. Smart Card

News.
Evetyman)s Encyclopaedia ..

London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.

(1973)
Ferguson, N. (1994).

Single Tenn Off-Lirie Coins. In Tor HeUeseth ··

100

I

_

\

.

. (Ed.), Adva~ces in Cryptology- Euro~rypt 19J:.

Gennany: Spr~nger-Verlag.
Ferreira, R. ( 1990).

The Practical Application of State of the Art
Security in Real Environments. In Sebeny &
'

\'=.

Pieprzyk (Eds.), Advances in Cryptology - ··.c •
A USCRYPT '90. Germany: Springer-Verlag.

Computer Communications Security. Englewood

Ford, W. (1994).

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Phantom Card Tricks. New Scientist. pp. 45-46.

Fox, B. (1993, Augt1st).
·. Finny, W: (1991).

Local Area Network Security.
In Preneel,
.
Govaerts & Vandewalle (Eds) Comput~r Security
!i
I

and Industrial Cryptography: State of the Art and
Evolution. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. ·
..

.

,,

Greiner, G. & Reissberg, U.

ECM Resistance in the HF Band by use of

'(1987); ·

Adaptive Reaction and Frequency-hopping.

Military Technology (Electronics in Defence) Vol
1I Issue 5.
Wide, Wider, Widest. . Journal of Electronic

Herskovitz, D. (1995, July).

De/enc~. Vol.IS, No.7, pp. 5.I-5K
Herskovitz, D. ·( 1995, June).

Come, Whisper in·MyEar. Joumal of Electronic .

Defence. Vol.18, No.6, pp. 46 - 52;
''

'

Hilvert, J. (1997, June).

..

.

.

_· What Price Your Private Life. Information Age_

- pp. 22-25.
Hodgson, K. (1995, March).

Smart Card's Advantage: Mobility, Security,
Flexibility. Security. pp. 22-24. - ,. ·

Hoffman, T.(1995, Mar~h).

Visa offers alternative to debit cards.

Computerworld v29 n13
Hoo}c, C. (1995, Ap~l). ·

Peculiar problems associated with applying RF/ID ..·.. , · ·

Automatic I.D. News Europe. pp. 2,5.:.27. _
Hutcheon, A. (1992).

Automated Teller Machines. In Jackson & Huskra . ·
(Eds.), Computer Security Reference Book. Boca

Ranton, Florida: CRC Press, Inc.

,_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
10_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ]

')

Ingleby, M. (1988).

Speech and image signals: recognition as
classification under uncertainty. In Moscardini &
Robinson (Eds) Mathematical Modelling/or
Information Technology: Telecommunication
reception, transmission and security. Chichester: ·

Ellis Horwood Limited.
. ISO/IEC 7816-3 Part 3, (1994).

JSO/IEC 7816-3. Identification Cards - Integrated·
''

circuit(s) cards with contacts -Part 3: Electronic
signals and transmission protocols. Geneva,
.

.

.

. . .: .

..

Janacek, G. & Lever, K. (1988).

Switzerland: ISO/IEC Copyright Office.
Ultra-Uniform Pseudorandom Number AlgorithII1s
.· for Cryptokey Generation. In Moscardini, A. &
· Robson, 0. (Eds)Mathematical ;\,fodellingfor
Information Technology, Telecommunication
Reception, Transmission and Security. Chichester:

· · · Ellis Horwood Ltd.
Johnson, 1. & Tolly, K. (1995,

Lab Test Token Authentication Systems.

July).

Australian Telecommunications. pp. 76-80.

Kientzle, T. (I 997, April).

Algorithm Alley: Understanding CRCs. Dr Dobbs
Journal. pp. 103-107
'

Kirkpatrick, S. (199 5,. April).

'

· Building Access: We take Visa, AmEx, MC ...
Security, pp. 30-32.

Land_wehr, Heitmeyer & Mclean, · A Security Model for Military Message Systems.. ·
(I 984, August).

ACM Transactions on cod,puter Systems 2(3) pp. ·
198-222.

Lathem-Sharpe, D. (1995),

Understanding What Smart Cards can do for You .·
· and Your Customers. Paper presented at the

Australasian Smart Card Summit. 27-28 March · ···
. 1995. Sydney Australia.

102

.

Lindley, R.A. & Tweedle, J.K:

· . The Next Challenge: Designing Secure
.

.

Multifunction Systems. Paper presented at the ·

(1995). ·

Australasian Smart Card Summit. 27-28 March.
.

.

.

1995. Sydney Australia

Longley, .D. & Shain, M. (1989). · .· Data and Computer Security. Dictionary of . : .

Standards, Concepts and Terms. Basingstoke:
Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
Longley, D;. (1994).

Access Control. In Caelli, Longley & Shain,

Information Security Handbook. Basingstoke,
:,:·,.

UK: Macmillan Press .

.Longley, D., Dawson, E., &
·caelii, w., (i994).

. Applications and Theory of Cryptography.. In
CaelJi, Longley & Shain, Information Security

.Handbook. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press.
Monad, E. (1990, ·Aprilt

France and Germany: Comparison of their Health
Insurance Chip Cards and Implementation

Smart .Card Monthly pp. 16-19.
Strategies.
.
.

Newton, H. (1994, Dec}
.

...

'

.

.

Feeding frenzy.(investing in telephom~;debit cards),

Te/econnect vl2 n12:
.

--/

Olsen. F. (1995, May);

.

Encryption cards and key management fall into
place. (the Department of Defense's Fortezz.a PC
Card)~ Government Computer Newsvl4 n9.

Parker, D.(1983).. ·

Fighting Computer Crime. New York: Schribner's
Sons.

· Paterson, M'. (1991).

Secure Single Chip Microcomputer Manufacture.
· In Chaum, D.(Ed.), Smart Card 2000. Holland:
· E1sevier Science Publishers B.V.

Phillips (1994).

DX Smart Card. (Manufacturer's literature)
·Eindhoven, Holland: Phillips B. V.

Rigney, S. (199~f).

Spread the signal PC Magazine v14 n1 .

Rivest, R., Shamir, A., &

· A method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and

Adelman, L., (1978, Feb).

Public key Cryptosystems. Communications of

the ACM Vol. 21(2), pp. 120-126.

103

Roberts, D. (1991).

.. Evaluation Criteria for 1.1:, Security. In Preneel,
· ·. Govaerts & Vandewalle (Eds) Computer Security

and Industrial Cryptography: State ofthe Art and ·
.

. .

. . .

Scheier, ·B.
'

'

...

.

(i 992, Feb).
11

· Evolution. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
· Pseudo-Random Sequence Generator for 32-bit

•

CPUs. Dr Dobbs Journal. p. 34
·Seberry, J. and Pieprzk; J.

Cryptography: An Introduction to Computer

(1989).

Security. Eng]ewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Sebesta. R. w. (1989).

Concepts of Programming Languages. California:
.

.

The Benjamin Cummings Publishing Company Inc.

l'

Seidman, S. (i 995, April).

News. Smart Card Monthly. pp. 10-15.

Shanrion, C. (1949).

Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,Be/1
. ' :

.

.

Systems Technical Journal. Vol. 29, pp 656-71:5.
Shiflet

.•A (1987)..

.

:

. .. ..

.

'

.

..

.

Discrete Mathematics/or Computer Science. New.·
York, West Publishing Company.

Smtilders, P. (199(), February). ·

The Threat oflnfonnation Theft by Reception of
Electromagnetic Radiation from RS-232 Cables:

. Computers and Security pp. 53~58.
System Technik..
Telefunken
~,

Electronic Wa,:fare _of the Land Forces. Product

(1993).

information from Telefunken System Technik
.

.

.

..

GrvIBH, Empfanger und Peiler, Sedanstrasse ·10,
D- 7900 U1m, Gennany.
-,

Tm.IS (19~4).

Texas Instn,ments Registration and Identification ·•

Systems. TIRJS - Overview of Technology, .·
Products and Applications. Austin TX: /fexas.
Instruments.
.

. .

-

.

Torrieri, D. (I 992).

Principles of Secure Communication Systems.
London: Artech House.

To~nend, R.(I 995)....

·Chip Card Vision - The Viewpoint ofMastercard · · .
International. Paper presented at the Australasian
Smart Caret Summit. 27-28 March I 995. Sydney
Australia.

104

Twentyman, J, (1997, June).

·. Van Order (1995, July).

.. Safe and Securer~ lnforn,,.ation Age pp. 32-36.
.·

:·

n

.

. Military Logistics Goes High Tech. SOI.Etter, A

publication of the Society ofLogistics Engineers.
Vol. 30, Issue 5. Hyattsville, MD 20785, USA.
·Vandewalle, J., Govaerts, R., &
Preneel, B. C1.991). · ·

Technical Approaches to Thwart Computer Fraud.· ·
In Preneel, Govaerts & Vandewalle (Eds)

Computer Security and Industrial Cryptography:
State of the Art and Evolution. Berlin: Springer'
'

'
'

'

Vedder,•K: (1992) ..

Verlag.
Smart Cards. Proceedings CompEuro92. Los
Alamitos: IEEE Cqmputer Society Press. pp: 630.;;
·. 635.

Vereen, L~ (199.6).

' Software Tools for Embedded Systems ·. '
"Development, Embedded Systems Programming;
Vol. 9. No. 10., pp19-57.

Verschuren, Govaerts, R. and

ISO-OSI Security Architecture. In .Preneel,

Vandewalle, J. (1991).

Govaerts & Vandewalle (Eds) Computer Security

and Industrial Cryptography: State of the Art and
. Evolution. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

105

u

